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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20150460-SC 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Assault by a Prisoner, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code§ 76-5-102.5. See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment). The comi of appeals certified this appeal to this Comi. See 
Addendum B (Certification Order). Utah Code § 78A-3-102(3)(b) confers jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether the State's destruction of a video of the alleged incident which 
occmTed at the prison violated state due process requiring dismissal where, among other 
things, the video captured the incident, there was evidence supporting the defense and 
contrary to the State's depiction of what occmTed, and the State was culpable in failing to 
preserve the video. 
Standard of Review: "Whether the State's destruction of potentially exculpatory 
evidence violates due process is a question of law that [this Comi] review[s] for 
c01Tectness." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,112, 162 P.3d 1106 (Addendum C). 
'"However, because this question requires application of facts in the record to the due 
process standard, [this Court] incorporate[s] a clearly eIToneous standard for the 
necessary subsidiary factual determinations."' Id. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. See R.37-44; 78-85; 92-100; 172, 174, 175; 
126-140 (trial court's ruling on motion to dismiss in Addendum D). 
RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. art. I, § 7 is in Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The incident in this case allegedly occmTed at the prison on September 27, 2013. 
R. 1. Almost four months later, the State filed an Information charging Appellant, 
Lissette Marie DeJesus, with Assault by a Prisoner. Three days after the court appointed 
counsel, DeJesus filed a motion for discovery, followed two days later by a Supplemental 
Discovery Request specifying fmther that the defense was requesting "[a] copy of the 
video of the alleged incident." R.4, 18. 
The State responded to the Supplemental Discovery Motion more than four 
months after it was filed, stating "[t]he State is unable to provide any video of the 
incident as none exist as per the Utah State Prison." R.25. 
Following preliminary hearing and bindover (R.30-31), DeJesus filed a "Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence," claiming that her state due process rights were 
violated by the State's failure to preserve the surveillance footage of the incident. R.37-
44, 78-84. After the trial court held an initial hearing, R.174, Dejesus filed a 
"Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss." R.92-100. Following 
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two more hearings, R.172, 175, the comt issued a memorandum decision denying 
DeJesus's motion. R.126-40; Addendum D. Subsequently, DeJesus filed a petition 
seeking interlocutory review, which the court of appeals denied. R.144-45. 
DeJesus entered a Se,y plea, reserving her right to appeal the trial comt's ruling. 
R.150-56; 173:3. She conditionally pleaded guilty to Assault by a Prisoner and was 
sentenced to serve 0-5 years in prison concmrently with the commitments she was 
already serving. R.148-49, 150-56. 
After DeJesus timely appealed, R.159-60, the court of appeals ce1tified the appeal 
to this Cornt. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Testimony regarding the incident supported DeJesus 's defense. 
In the fall of 2013, DeJesus was an inmate housed in Timpanogos 3 at the Utah 
State Prison. R.56-58. She shared a cell with inmate Dash; inmate Khan lived in the 
neighboring cell. R.57, 62. 
On September 27, 2013, DeJesus was in her cell when Officer Ronald Hansen 
("the guard" or "Hansen") escorted Dash and Khan back to their respective cells after 
recreation time. R.56-57. The guard directed Khan to stand in front of her cell door, but 
she disobeyed and stood in front of DeJesus's door instead. R.63. The women began 
arguing and DeJesus's cell door opened prematurely. R.58-59, 63-64. According to the 
guard, DeJesus "came out and swung at[] Khan." R.59. The guard testified that he pulled 
DeJesus off of Khan, picked her up and caiTied her back to her cell, but was not able to 
3 
secure the cell door. R.59. He testified that DeJesus then came out of her cell, and she 
and Khan engaged in mutual combat. R.60, 69. 
The guard inserted himself between the women and pushed DeJesus to the floor. 
R.60. At the preliminary hearing, the guard testified that DeJesus "looked directly at 
[him] and then kicked" him in the lower abdomen and the right thigh while Khan was 
"behind [him] a few feet." R.60. But on cross-examination, he testified that Khan was 
"on [his] back" dming the incident and he "d[id]n' t know exactly where she was" as he 
"could not see" Khan. R. 70. 
Inmate Ataata, who identified herself as DeJesus's fiancee, lived in an adjacent 
cell and viewed most of the incident. R.175: 17-20. She testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that there was no point at which Khan disengaged and that she did not stand a few feet 
back from DeJesus and the guard. R.175: 17-20. Instead, as the guard had testified on 
cross during the preliminary hearing, Ataata testified that Khan was on the guard's back 
during the incident. R.17 5: 17-19. Khan was attempting to "swing" "over [ the guard] to 
get to DeJ esus." R.17 5: 17-19. Dash, who was also present during the incident, invoked 
her right against self-incrimination and did not testify. R. 175: 14-15. 
DeJesus denied "that she intentionally kicked Officer Hansen and [maintained] 
that if there was any contact with the officer, it was purely accidental and not done 
intending to cause him bodily injury" while reasonably defending herself against Khan's 
imminent attack. R.40. 
4 
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A video captured the event,· the guard viewed the videotape and testified that 
viewing it filled in gaps in his perception and memory. 
The guard viewed a videotape of the event about fifteen minutes after the alleged 
altercation ended. R. 71-73. A surveillance camera, which was functioning properly, had 
been aimed at the exact area where the altercation occurred and had captured that event. 
R.71-73. 
The guard testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding what he remembered 
seeing on the videotape. He said the videotape showed that Khan was disengaged and 
was about four to six feet behind him when he pushed DeJesus to the ground. R.175:3. 
When confronted about his prior testimony that Khan was on his back and he did not see 
where Khan was at the time of the assault, the guard testified that he meant he did not 
know where she was while the incident was occmTing. R.175:4-7. He indicated that he 
later learned Khan's location by viewing the video. R.175:6. 
The State failed to preserve the videotape. 
Although the incident was recorded and the guard immediately viewed the 
recording, a permanent copy was not made, and the recording was destroyed. R.172:6. 
The guard wrote an incident report and gave it to his supervisor, Captain Redding 
("the captain"). R.175:8-9. The captain turned the repo1i over to the prison investigations 
unit, and about an hour and a half after the incident, an investigator talked with the guard. 
R.175:9. Although the guard had immediately viewed the recording, he could not order 
that a pe1manent copy be made. Rl 75:10. 
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The digital recording was available in the control room, and both the captain and 
the investigator had "access to watch a playback[.]" R.17 5: 11. Neither testified regarding 
the details of the recording, and there is no evidence that either the captain or the 
investigator watched the video. 
Investigator Kemp ("the investigator") is employed by the Department of 
Con-ections as part of the Law Enforcement Bureau. R.172:2. Her job is "to investigate 
any criminal matter; state, federal, in the prison system and outside." R.172:2. 
The investigator responded to Timpanogos 3 and went first to the officers' station. 
R.172:3. She asked whether there was a recording and learned that there was one and that 
it had been viewed. R.172:3. After being "shown where the incident occun-ed" and 
conducting interviews, she returned to the control room and asked that a permanent copy 
of the recording be made. R.172:3. The officer in the control room was new and the 
investigator did not know her name. R.172:5-6. 
The investigator testified that the prison does not have a policy regarding the 
permanent retention of recordings from prison surveillance cameras. R.172:2. Recordings 
stay on the surveillance equipment for only thi1ty days and then are recorded over if a 
permanent copy is not requested. R.172:5-6, 8; R.129. Permanent copies are made in the 
control room. R.172:6. Either the captain or a lieutenant could have made a permanent 
copy. R. 172:7. 
The investigator got busy and did not follow-up. R. 172:4. She had to do more 
background checks on applicants than she normally did, and therefore did not pay 
attention to this investigation during the thi1ty days or more following the event. R.172:4, 
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7. When the investigator finally followed-up, she contacted several people to h·y to locate 
the recording; again, she could not give the names of the people she had talked to. 
R.172:6, 8. They told her to contact the captain. R.172:6. The captain, who was able to 
download the video without a request from the investigator, told the investigator that 
"after 30 days, it goes off the camera." R.172:6. The captain also said that if a copy had 
been made, it had been misplaced and that "she had never seen a copy." R.172:6. The 
state did not present any written documentation showing that the request for a permanent 
copy of the videotape was made or followed-up on. 
Charges were not filed for almost four months, again because the investigator was 
busy doing checks on applicants. R.172:4. By that time, the recording had been 
destroyed. R.172:6. Immediately after being appointed, defense counsel filed a motion 
for discovery, followed by a supplemental motion specifically requesting a copy of the 
video. R.4, 18. The State did not respond to the Supplemental Discovery Request for 
almost four months. R.25. When the State did respond, it did not tell the defense that a 
video had been made, but had not been preserved; instead, it stated "[t]he State is unable 
to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per the Utah State Prison." R.25. 
DeJesus moved to dismiss the charge based on the violation of her state due 
process rights. 
DeJesus filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Preserve Evidence, arguing that 
the State's destruction of the surveillance video capturing the alleged assault violated 
state due process. R.37-44; see also R.45-53; 78-85. During argument, the trial court 
suggested that DeJesus had "to make a showing that there's reasonable probability that 
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the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory" before it considered "the other factors of 
the good or bad faith of the State, and the prejudice." R.174: 1-2. The court then decided 
that it needed additional evidence before ruling, and scheduled the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. R.174: 17-24. 
Before the evidentiary hearing, DeJesus filed a supplemental memorandum. R.92-
100. That supplemental memorandum argued in part that state due process and 
Tiedemann did not require a defendant to make a threshold showing that there is a 
"reasonable probability" that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory. R.92-100. 
DeJesus fmiher explained that in dete1mining whether state due process was violated by 
the destruction of evidence, the trial comi was required to consider the rule 16 factors 
discussed in Tiedemann regardless of whether she demonstrated a reasonable probability 
that the video would be exculpatory. R.94-96. Additionally, the trial court was "obligated 
to also consider the reason for the loss of evidence and the prejudice to Ms. DeJesus," 
because evidence already in the record showed a reasonable probability that the destroyed 
evidence would be exculpatory. R.97-99. 
The trial court incorrectly denied the motion to dismiss. 
The trial comi issued a memorandum decision denying DeJesus's motion to 
dismiss. R.126-40; Addendum D. The court concluded that a defendant "must first 
demonstrate," as a threshold matter, "a ' reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed 
evidence would be exculpatory." R.132-33. It stated that "[t]he only possible evidence [of 
the video's exculpatory value] ... [wa]s the testimony of Ataata" and her testimony "was 
not believable and thus [] not reasonable." R.134-35. The comi then concluded that 
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DeJesus failed to show a reasonable probability that the recording was exculpatory and it 
therefore did "not need to examine the reasons for the destruction or ... the degree of 
prejudice suffered by defendant." R.13 5. 
Neve1iheless, the comi decided to examine the reason for the video's destruction 
in case it was "wrong" about the exculpatory nature of the recording. R.135. The comi 
recognized that if the video had been consistent with the guard's testimony, "common 
sense would indicate that recording would be retained." R.136. On the other hand, if the 
video "showed contrary to what Hansen said, then it would make more logical sense to 
destroy it rather than if it supported him." R.136. Moreover, the court found it "very 
difficult, if not impossible ... to understand why prison personnel, would not, with full 
knowledge that a claimed assault had occmTed by an inmate against a guard, maintain a 
recording of the event." R.136. And the judge pointed out that "[ m ]ore responsible 
conduct by the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would preclude such 
a motion [to dismiss for destruction of the evidence] and preclude the requirement that 
the court attempt to 'divine' what the recording showed." R.137. Ultimately, however, 
the court concluded that the failure to preserve the video "amount[ ed] to negligence, but 
not in a high degree" and decided there was "no culpable conduct by anyone in the 
Department of Corrections." R.13 7. The court also did not believe that destruction of the 
evidence was "related to any 'decision' made by anyone," and "the reasons for its non-
existence do not support a dismissal." R.135, 136. 
The trial court did not examine in detail the degree of prejudice suffered by 
DeJesus, but did indicate that while there would not be any prejudice to DeJesus if the 
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recording was consistent with Hansen's testimony, the destruction would be prejudicial if 
the video were consistent with DeJesus's claims. R.136. The judge thought, however, that 
DeJesus had not shown "any reasonable, believable probability the recording shows what 
defendant claims" and it therefore did "not matter why or how it was destroyed." R.136. 
The trial court concluded that the reasons for the loss of the video favored the State rather 
than dismissal, even though the State was negligent and it was "difficult if not 
impossible" to understand why it did not preserve the videotape. The trial court therefore 
denied the motion to dismiss. R.135-138. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's failure to preserve a video recording that captured the incident which 
occurred at the prison violated DeJesus's state due process 1ights and requires dismissal. 
The trial court incorrectly required DeJesus to make a threshold showing that the 
recording would be exculpatory before conducting the balancing test outlined in 
Tiedemann. Neither Tiedemann nor the cases it relied on required such a threshold 
showing. Instead, Tiedemann held that a state due process violation occurs when the 
factors considered under rule 16 along with the factors considered by other states weigh 
in favor of the defendant. Moreover, the threshold requirement adopted by the trial court 
works against fundamental fairness and would encourage destruction of evidence since it 
is difficult if not impossible to prove the exculpatory content of evidence that has been 
destroyed. 
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A proper application of the state due process balancing test demonsh·ates that 
DeJesus's rights were violated by the destruction of the videotape. All four factors 
considered under rule 16 weigh in favor of DeJesus's claim. 
First, evidence supported DeJesus's defense that the prosecution's representation 
of the incident was inaccurate. Testimony from an inmate along with the guard's 
testimony on cross-examination supported DeJ esus' s defense that Khan was on the 
guard's back and DeJesus was acting to defend herself. Moreover, the State was not 
forthcoming about the destruction of the evidence when it responded to DeJesus' s 
supplemental discovery motion specifically requesting the recording. Second, the 
destruction of the recording left DeJesus without a meaningful opp01iunity to defend 
since she was left with the testimony of inmates against that of a guard. Third, the 
culpability of the State, which was at least negligent, also works in favor of a due process 
violation. The judge recognized that the State was negligent, which alone shows 
culpability. But the State' s conduct went beyond mere negligence where neither the 
captain nor the investigator took adequate steps to preserve the recording even though the 
guard viewed it immediately after the incident and its importance had been identified. 
The lack of policies for preserving recordings of prison incidents and the fact that this is 
not an isolated event also demonstrate the State's culpability. Finally, DeJesus had no 
opportunity or access to the recording or any other means of obtaining similar evidence. 
Fmther, although DeJesus was not required to demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the recording would be exculpatory, Tiedemann directs that when a 
reasonable probability is demonstrated, comts consider two additional factors- the 
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State's "degree of negligence or culpability" and "the degree of prejudice to the 
defendant in light of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the 
context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the missing evidence." 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144. These factors appear to be aimed at the consequences of a 
due process violation rather than its existence. But either way, they work in favor of 
dismissal. 
First, the trial court imposed too stringent a test when assessing whether there was 
a reasonable probability that the evidence would be exculpatory. A reasonable probability 
does not require proof that the evidence was in fact exculpatory. Instead, it falls 
somewhere between "mere possibility" and "more likely than not" and significantly 
below the much more stringent "reasonable certainty." Even under reasonable certainty, a 
defendant need not prove that evidence is in fact exculpatory. Instead, courts focus on the 
nature of the defense and whether there is evidence from other sources that supp01ts the 
defense position. Moreover, fundamental fairness requires that the test not be as stringent 
as the trial court required, especially since it is difficult if not impossible to prove the 
exculpatory nature of destroyed evidence and too stringent a test would encourage 
destruction of the evidence. Here, the nature of the defense and the fact that there was 
evidence from an inmate and also testimony from the guard that supp01ted that defense 
show that there was a reasonable probability that the recording would be exculpatory. 
The type of evidence, the ease with which a permanent recording could have been made, 
the fact that the recording captured the incident and was viewed by the guard, the lack of 
cumulative evidence, and the fact that the State's case was based only on the guard's 
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testimony, among other things, further demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 
recording would be exculpatory. 
The prejudice to DeJesus and the State's culpability both weigh in favor of 
dismissal. The recording was material and necessary to DeJesus's defense and the State's 
conduct went beyond negligence in failing to preserve this critical piece of evidence. 
Reversal is therefore required. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PRESERVE A VIDEOTAPE THAT 
RECORDED THE INCIDENT VIOLATED ST ATE DUE PROCESS. 
Aiticle 1, section 7 of Utah's Constitution provides more expansive due process 
protection than its federal counterpart when the State fails to preserve evidence. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49. This Comt rejected the federal due process approach to 
destruction of evidence claims, concluding that a defendant who claims that state due 
process was violated by the State's failure to preserve mate1ial evidence is not required to 
establish bad faith on the part of the prosecution. Id. (rejecting Arizona v. Youngblood, 
488 U.S. 51 (1988)). Instead, for state due process claims, this Court adopted a balancing 
"approach under rule 16 [ of the Rules of Criminal Procedure]" which makes "the 
culpability or bad faith of the state ... only one consideration, not the bright line test." 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ~41. This balancing of factors is required "on a case-by-case 
basis," with "fundamental fairness" as the "touchstone for the balancing process." Id. at 
~~44-45. 
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In reaching its decision that state due process requires a different test than 
federal due process for destruction of evidence claims, this Court recognized that 
"[m]any states ... have explored this question under their state due process guarantees" 
and have agreed that the focus in loss or destruction of evidence claims is on 
"fundamental fairness" instead of whether the State acted in bad faith. Id. ( citing 
Thorne v. Dep 't. of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 
657 A.2d 585, 594-95 (Conn. 1995); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 87 (Del. 1989); 
State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 
N.E.2d 496, 496-97 (Mass. 1991); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912,914 (Tenn. 1999); 
State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalwni, 461 S.E.2d 504, 
512 (W.Va. 1995)); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring). This 
Court outlined the balancing approach applicable to claims that destruction of evidence 
violates due process under Utah's Constitution, indicating it: 
should embrace the basic principles we have adopted under rule 16 and the 
factors mentioned by other states. In cases where a defendant has shown a 
reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory, we find it necessary to require consideration of the following: 
(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 
degree of negligence or culpability on the pmt of the State; and (2) the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
imp01tance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole, 
including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, i!44. Based on this passage, one panel of the comt of appeals 
and the trial comt in this case misinterpreted Tiedemann to require a threshold showing 
by defendants that there is a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory before conducting a balancing test. See State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, 
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,124, 322 P.2d 746, quoting Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ,144; see also R.132-33 (requiring 
defendant to "first demonstrate a 'reasonable probability' that lost or destroyed evidence 
would be exculpatory" and concluding DeJesus had not established the requisite 
reasonable probability); compare State v. Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,1,119-22, 243 P.3d 
902 (balancing factors without requiring a threshold showing that evidence had a 
reasonable probability of being exculpatory). 1 
The trial court's ruling requiring DeJesus to establish a reasonable probability that 
the video was exculpatory before conducting the state due process balancing test is 
incorrect. R.132-33. The ruling also misapplies the concept of "reasonable probability," 
setting an unreasonably high threshold for criminal defendants who are deprived of 
material evidence that is or might be exculpatory. R.135. In this case, there was a 
reasonable probability that the videotape which filmed the prison incident would be 
exculpatory where the guard and an inmate gave testimony that supported the defense 
and which was not consistent with the state's depiction. Moreover, the prejudice to 
DeJesus caused by the destruction of the video and the culpability of the State in failing 
to preserve a videotape that captured the event weigh in favor of dismissal. A correct 
application of the balancing test outlined in Tiedemann demonstrates that the State's 
1 The court of appeals decided Jackson prior to Otkovic. The decisions are 
inconsistent since Otkovic requires a threshold showing of a reasonable probability that 
the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory whereas Jackson simply balanced the 
factors as required by Tiedemann. See Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, ,124 (requiring 
threshold showing); compare Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, ,1,110, 19-21 (applying a 
balancing test to "potentially exculpatory evidence" without requiring a threshold 
showing). 
15 
destruction of the videotape violated state due process and requires dismissal of the 
charge. 
A. The state due process balancing test adopted in Tiedemann does not include 
a threshold requirement that the defendant establish a reasonable probability 
that the evidence would be exculpatory. 
Tiedemann and the other cases this Court relied on in Tiedemann demonstrate that 
a defendant is not required to make a threshold showing that destroyed evidence would 
be exculpatory before conducting the state due process balancing test. Id. at iJiJ42-44. 
Instead, Tiedemann adopted a state due process balancing test based on rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and factors considered by other courts. Id. at iJ44. 
The State's extensive obligation under rule 16 to provide criminal defendants with 
"information possessed by the State to aid their defense" is the starting place in any 
inquiry as to whether state due process was violated by the destruction of evidence. Id. at 
iJ40. A "prosecutor's good faith ignorance does not excuse non-disclosure" under rule 16. 
Id. Instead, courts consider several non-exclusive factors in deciding whether to exclude 
evidence based on the State's "failure to fully disclose" evidence. Id. at iJ41. Those non-
exclusive factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the prosecution's representation [of existing 
evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or 
misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could 
prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting the 
pertinent information or misstating the facts, and (4) the extent to which 
appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or 
misstated evidence. 
Id. As Tiedemann indicates, the State has the "broad obligation" to preserve and disclose 
evidence when these factors weigh in favor of such disclosure, and the failure to preserve 
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such evidence violates due process when these factors and those embraced by other states 
balance in favor of the defendant. Id. at 1140-41. This test adopted in Tiedemann requires 
comis to balance these factors regardless of whether a defendant can demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory. 
Cases from other states that have adopted a state due process analysis for 
destruction of evidence claims also do not require a threshold showing of a reasonable 
probability that the evidence would be exculpatory before balancing factors to determine 
whether the destruction of evidence violated due process. See id. at 1142-44 ( citing cases 
adopting state due process analysis). These cases show that this Court did not intend to 
impose a high threshold before conducting a balancing test and instead intended to 
embrace a balancing test based on fundamental fairness even if the defendant could not 
establish that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory. Id.; see Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 
(balancing the state's culpability, the materiality of the evidence and the prejudice caused 
by the destruction of evidence without requiring threshold showing that evidence was 
exculpatory); Morales, 657 A.2d at 594-95 (weighing, among other things, the 
imp01iance of the evidence, "the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the 
degree of prejudice to the accused" without requiring threshold showing); Hammond, 569 
A.2d at 87-90 ( considering the degree of the state's culpability, the imp01iance of 
evidence, and the prejudice to accused without requiring defendant to show that 
destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory); Henderson, 582 N.E.2d at 496-97 
(balancing "the degree of culpability of the government, the materiality of the evidence, 
and the potential prejudice to the defendant" without requiring threshold showing); 
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Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d at 917 (balancing degree of state's negligence, significance of the 
evidence, and sufficiency of other evidence without requiring showing that destroyed 
evidence was exculpatory); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994) (indicating 
that courts will consider sanction for destruction of evidence whenever there is a 
"reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be exculpatory," by considering 
government's level of negligence or culpability and prejudice to defendant) ( emphasis 
added); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1995) (indicating that when the 
destroyed evidence would have been subject to disclosure under rule 16 and the state 
breached its duty to preserve, consequences are decided based on level of state's 
negligence, materiality of the destroyed evidence, and sufficiency of remaining 
evidence). 
Rather than requiring a threshold showing that the evidence would be exculpatory 
before conducting a state due process balancing test, these other cases recognize that the 
state due process test applies when the destroyed evidence is only "potentially 
exculpatory." See, e.g., Morales, 657 A.2d at 595; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87; 
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d at 497; Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912; Delisle, 648 A.2d at 642-44; 
Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d at 512. This concern for the destruction of potentially exculpatory 
evidence in other state due process cases is consistent with this Court's recognition in 
Tiedemann that the issue before it was "[ w ]hether the State's destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence" violated state due process. Id. at ,r12 (emphasis added). In fact, 
these other cases recognize that where the claim is based on the State's failure to preserve 
evidence, defendants ordinarily will have difficulty establishing that the evidence was in 
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fact exculpatory since the evidence no longer exists. See, e.g., Morales, 657 A.2d at 589; 
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1330-31; Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87. This 
recognition that defendants ordinarily will not be able to establish the exculpatory value 
of destroyed evidence further demonstrates that the cases do not treat a defendant's 
inability to prove exculpatory value as 1igid ba1Tier to thoughtful balancing. 
Instead of requiring a threshold showing of exculpatory value, these other cases 
conduct balancing tests to determine whether the destruction of evidence violated state 
due process. For example, in Thorne, the comi applied a balancing test in deciding 
whether destruction of a videotape of field sob1iety tests (FST's) violated the defendant's 
right to due process and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at a driver's license hearing 
following a DUI arrest. 774 P.2d at 1330-31. The court recognized that "considerations of 
fundamental fairness dictate that where the burden of preservation is so slight, evidence 
being potentially relevant to an issue of central imp01iance at a revocation proceeding 
should be preserved." Id. at 1330. It pointed out that the government's "good or bad 
faith" is not dispositive, and that where the evidence has been destroyed, the focus is on 
whether the destroyed evidence would have played a meaningful role. Id. Because the 
destroyed videotape of FST's "might have led the jury to ente1iain a reasonable doubt" if 
it showed the defendant performing the well, it was of central importance to the hearing. 
Id. The court concluded that "where the burden of preservation is so minimal, and the 
evidence is of even slight potential relevance, the state bears a heavy burden in justifying 
its destruction." Id. at 1131. Because the state had "not borne its burden," the court 
concluded that destruction of the evidence violated due process. Id. 
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In Morales, the court balanced various factors which included "the materiality of 
the missing evidence, the likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by witnesses or the 
jury, the reason for its nonavailability to the defense and the prejudice to the defendant 
caused by the unavailability .... " Morales, 657 A.2d at 593. There, the court concluded 
that the defendant's due process rights were violated by the State's loss of potentially 
exculpatory evidence-a jacket with semen stains that would have absolved the 
defendant if the stains were tested and shown not to have been deposited by the 
defendant. Id. at 593-95. 
And, in Delaware, courts examine the claim that loss or destruction of evidence 
violated state due process under the following test: 
1) would the requested material, if extant in the possession of the State at 
the time of the defense request, have been subject to disclosure under 
Criminal Rule 16 or Brady?2 
2) if so, did the government have a duty to preserve the material? 
3) if there was a duty to preserve, was the duty breached, and what 
consequences would flow from the breach? 
Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86. If there has been the breach of a duty to preserve, Delaware 
employs another three-pait test to detennine the consequences of that breach: "(l) the 
degree of negligence or bad faith involved, (2) the impo1tance of the missing evidence 
considering the probative value and reliability of secondary or substitute evidence that 
remains available, and (3) the sufficiency of other evidence produced at the tiial to 
sustain the conviction." Id.; see also Ferguson, 2 S.W. 3d at 917. These factors 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
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considered by other states further demonstrate that a defendant is not required to establish 
a reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence would be exculpatory before 
conducting the state due process balancing test. 
Moreover, fundamental fairness is not served by a test that relieves a comt from 
thoughtful balancing whenever a defendant fails to establish the exculpatory value of the 
missing evidence. In other words, a defendant's rights under state due process are not 
adequately protected by a "litmus test" that turns on the defendant's ability to satisfy a 
nearly unattainable burden. Morales, 657 A.2d at 592; see also Low v. City of Monticello, 
2004 UT 90, 'i[15, 103 P.3d 130 ("Due process is not a rigid concept."). Making the test 
contingent on a defendant's ability to show exculpatory value could also "have the 
unfortunate effect of encouraging the destruction of evidence to the extent that evidence 
destroyed becomes merely 'potentially useful' since its contents would be unprovable." 
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 n.9. 
Instead of requiring a threshold showing as to the exculpatory value of the 
destroyed evidence, "[t]he application of due process requires a thorough analysis of the 
circumstances and facts paiticular to a case." Kennon v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 77, 
'i[29, 270 P.3d 417; see also Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 'i[42 (citing cases that recognize that 
"fundamental fairness," as an element of due process, "requires that the State's failure to 
preserve evidence that could be favorable to the defendant be evaluated in the context of 
the entire record.") (citation omitted). Thus, "[r]ather than allow a State's ineptitude to 
saddle a defendant with an impossible burden, a court should focus on the type of 
evidence, the possibility it might prove exculpatory, and the existence of other evidence 
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going to the same point of contention in determining whether the failure to preserve the 
evidence in question violated due process." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 69 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). Hence, Tiedemann and fundamental fairness require "some balancing . .. on 
a case-by-case basis" of the nonexclusive rule 16 factors and the factors utilized by other 
states regardless of whether a defendant can show exculpatory value. 2007 UT 49, i]44. 
Moreover, the state due process protection for destruction of evidence claims 
would not have any significance if defendants were required to establish a threshold 
showing of the exculpatory nature of the evidence. Aside from the difficulty in 
establishing that evidence is exculpatory when the evidence has been destroyed, the 
protection would add little where the exculpatory value was established since federal due 
process othe1wise requires that the State disclose exculpatory evidence. See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). In fact, 
Utah law recognizes that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the State has two independent 
obligations to provide evidence to the defense." State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 
1994 ). The first duty, based on federal due process, is "to provide, without request by the 
defendant, all exculpatory evidence." Id. This duty requires the State to provide all 
evidence "which is or may be exculpatory." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 
1988) (emphasis added) . Since due process already required the State to preserve and 
disclose evidence to the defense that is or may be exculpatory, the state due process 
protection outlined in Tiedemann would add nothing to the analysis if defendants had to 
establish that the evidence was exculpatory in order to consider whether state due process 
was violated by the destruction of the evidence, while at the same time "encouraging the 
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desh·uction of[exculpatory] evidence." Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 n.9. This further 
demonstrates that the trial comi's threshold requirement that DeJesus establish the 
exculpatory value of the missing videotape was incon-ect. 
Tiedemann, cases from other states cited in Tiedemann, and fundamental fairness 
all show that the trial court incon-ectly required DeJesus to establish the exculpatory 
nature of the destroyed videotape before conducting a balancing test to determine 
whether state due process was violated. See R.132-33. Because the trial comi inc01rectly 
required this threshold showing and did not balance the rule 16 and other factors based on 
its determination that DeJesus had not established the exculpatory nature of the evidence 
(R.132-35), the trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
B. Proper application of the state due process balancing test establishes that the 
state's destruction of the videotape of the alleged incident violates due 
process. 
Rather than requiring a threshold showing that the destroyed evidence was 
exculpatory, Tiedemann directs h·ial comis to consider the rule 16 factors and the factors 
considered by other states when evaluating a motion to dismiss based on destruction of 
evidence. 2007 UT 49, ,r,r4I , 44. Additionally, 
"[i]n cases where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, [this Court found] it necessary to 
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction or loss of 
the evidence, including the degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the 
State and (2) the degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and 
importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including 
the strength of the remaining evidence." 
Id. at if44. Fundamental fairness guides the balancing process. Id. at ,I45. 
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In this case, the trial court incorrectly required a threshold showing that there was 
a reasonable probability that the evidence was exculpatory, and erroneously determined 
that it was not required to analyze the factors listed in Tiedemann. R.135. Moreover, 
although the trial court ultimately considered the reason for the destruction, including the 
culpability of the state in case it was "wrong about the exculpatory nature of the 
recording," it failed to consider the rule 16 factors and its analysis of the State's 
culpability and the prejudice to DeJesus was deficient. R. 135-38. Correctly analyzed, 
these factors demonstrate that the State's destruction of the videotape of the incident 
violated state due process, requiring dismissal. 
l. The rule 16 factors, which were not considered by the trial court, 
demonstrate that the destruction of the videotape violated state due 
process. 
"It is a matter of clear Utah law that criminal defendants are entitled to 
infonnation possessed by the State to aid in their defense." Id. at i/40. This Court has 
recognized that under rule 16, prosecutors have "broad obligations ... to produce" and 
disclose evidence, and has "identified several factors under rule 16 to guide a trial court's 
decision on a motion to exclude prosecution evidence because of a failure to fully 
disclose." Id. at i!i/40 ( citation omitted). "These factors are also relevant to a motion, like 
the one here, to dismiss charges for destruction of evidence." Id. The non-exclusive rule 
16 factors are: 
(1) The extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing 
evidence] is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or 
misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could 
prejudice the outcome, (3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting 
pertinent information or misstating facts, and ( 4) the extent to which 
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appropriate defense investigation would have discovered the omitted or 
misstated evidence. 
Id., citing Kallin, 877 P.2d at 143; see also Jackson, 2010 UT App 328, 120 (recognizing 
that "[ w ]hen evaluating a motion to dismiss based on destrnction of evidence, courts 
should consider the 'nonexclusive factors' outlined in rnle 16 ... "). 
As DeJ esus argued below, the comt was "required to consider the rnle 16 factors 
regardless of whether there is a showing that the evidence is exculpatory," and "a 
balancing of the rule 16 factors weighs in favor of dismissal." R.94-95. 
The first factor- "the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the 
existing evidence] is actually inaccurate"- weighs in favor of disclosure. Although 
Hansen testified at the evidentiary hearing that the recording showed that Khan was 4-6 
feet behind him and "backing off' (R.175:3, 4-5), he had previously testified at the 
preliminary hearing that Khan was "on my back, I don't know exactly where she was" 
but "she was no longer on my shoulder." R. 70-71. Hansen attempted to explain these 
inconsistencies during the evidentiary hearing by saying that he meant that he did not 
know where Khan was while the incident was occmTing, but he later viewed the 
recording and saw that she was a few feet back. Rl 75:5. Although the judge accepted 
Hansen's explanation, the explanation did not clarify why he would have testified that 
Khan was on his back if she were a few feet behind him. The guard's testimony that 
Khan was on his back supp01ts the defense and is consistent with Ataata's testimony that 
Khan did not disengage, that she was behind Hansen, and that "she was right there on his 
back the whole time." R.175:18-19. These inconsistencies in the guard's testimony 
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support DeJesus's defense and indicate that the prosecution's depiction of the incident is 
inaccurate. 3 
Moreover, the fact that the defense was not consistent with the prosecution's 
representation of what occmTed further demonstrates that the first rule 16 factor weighs 
in favor of dismissal. Ataata testified, consistent with the defense, that Khan was right 
behind the officer "and reaching toward defendant and trying to strike defendant when 
she hit Hansen." R.132. She also testified that Khan "was right there on [Hansen's] back 
the whole time." R.175: 19. Because Ataata had a close relationship with DeJesus, the 
judge decided to disregard her testimony. R.132. But Ataata's testimony was to some 
extent consistent with Hansen's testimony at the preliminary hearing that Khan was on 
his back. And, regardless of how the judge felt about Ataata's credibility, DeJesus was 
entitled to have her defense presented to a jury who would make relevant findings. The 
fact that there was evidence indicating that the officer's representation of the event was 
not accurate points out not only the importance of the video to this case but also weighs 
in favor of finding a state due process violation. 
Additionally, the State responded to DeJesus's supplemental discovery request, 
stating, "[t]he State is unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist (sic) as 
per the Utah State Prison." R.117. This response failed to accurately infonn DeJesus that 
the incident had been recorded, that Hansen had viewed the recording shortly after the 
3 The trial court's finding that "[t]he only possible evidence [of the recording's 
exculpatory value . .. [wa]s the testimony of Ataata" is clearly e1Toneous. The guard's 
testimony that Khan was on his back, though later refuted, also demonstrated the 
potential exculpatory value of the recording. R.70, 134. 
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incident, and that the recording had subsequently been destroyed. This representation of 
the evidence was also inaccurate, weighing in Dejesus's favor. 
The second factor also weighs in DeJesus's favor. The unavailability of the 
recording completely changed the defense's approach to this case. Because the State's 
evidence was based on the testimony of a prison guard and the judge had already 
indicated that he did not consider Ataata credible, this case resolved in a Sery plea instead 
of a trial. Indeed, the video provided the most accurate evidence of what actually 
transpired and was critical because the testimony of a convicted felon may carry very 
little weight against that of a prison guard. See Pettit v. Smith, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1111 
(D. Ariz. 2014) (recognizing that testimony of a convicted felon and other inmates does 
not carry the same weight against the testimony of uniformed guards as does a video of a 
prison incident, and pointing out the imp01tance of a video in "potentially assist[ing] the 
jury to understand the tenor of the event and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses 
who are providing conflicting descriptions."); see also Morales, 657 A.2d at 593 ('"Of 
course, there is the additional difficulty of proving that the police knew the evidence to be 
exculpatory. Few officers will be willing to admit they desh·oyed evidence they knew to 
be exculpatory."'). Had the video been preserved, DeJesus could have taken her case to a 
jury that would not have been "forced to rely on the conclusions drawn by the various 
witnesses" as to what occurred, and instead would have been able to form their own 
conclusions. Pettit, 45 F. Supp. at 1111. This second rule 16 factor-whether the 
destruction led the defense into a strategy that prejudiced the outcome- therefore also 
weighs in favor of a state due process violation. 
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Third, the State had a significant degree of culpability not only in omitting 
pertinent information in its discovery response but also in destroying the video. The trial 
court recognized that the State was negligent but thought the negligence was "not in a 
high degree." R.13 7. While mere negligence is enough to show culpability, the trial 
comi's diminution of the State's negligence is incorrect because it went beyond mere 
negligence for the State to have allowed the footage to be destroyed. People v. Handy, 
988 N.E.2d 879, 882-83 (N.Y. 2013). When a recording captures events surrounding an 
offense, the State has an obligation to preserve that video and "take whatever steps are 
necessary to insure that the video will not be erased-whether by simply taking a tape or 
disc out of a machine, or by instructing a computer not to delete the material." Id. "In 
view of the importance of the video recordings, it [goes] beyond mere negligence for the 
[State] ... not to have adequate safeguards in place for protection of the recordings." 
Peschel v. City Of Missoula, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146-47 (D. Mont. 2009) (concluding 
that city's failure to preserve video recording of incident that was recorded on police 
car's video camera was reckless).4 
In this case, the video was not available by the time the case was filed and counsel 
appointed. "No one, in sh01i, knows if in fact a hard recording was made but no one 
4 Prosecutors are not the only state agents charged with preserving and producing 
potentially exculpatory evidence. In fact, "[i]nformation known to police officers 
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the officers are paii of the 
prosecution team." State v. Shabala, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). "Neither the 
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or 
evidence valuable to a defendant." Id.; State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 n.5 (Utah 
1987). Likewise, information known to state correctional officers and investigators is 
chai·ged to the prosecution. 
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claims it exists." R.131. But Hansen viewed the video immediately after the incident. 
R.175:2. He wrote a report and turned it into his supervisor, the captain, who repmted the 
incident to the investigations unit. R.175:8-9. The investigations unit contacted Hansen 
that same day. R.175:9. Either the captain or the investigator could have asked "for a 
burned DVD from this digital recording." R.175:10. The investigator requested a copy of 
the video from the officer in the control room, but could not remember the officer's name 
and said "she was new." R.172:3 , 6-8. Although the image remained for thirty days 
before being destroyed, the investigator did not follow-up on obtaining the recording 
until more than thi1ty days later. R.172:5. Even during the follow-up, the investigator did 
not name whom she had talked to and could not remember when she requested the 
recording. The investigator remembered that she was sent to the captain, who told the 
investigator that if a hard copy of the recording had been made, it had been lost. R.172:3, 
6, 8. The fact that the recording captured the incident and had been viewed by Hansen, 
along with the failure of prison personnel to ensure that a permanent recording was made 
and the failure to follow-up in a timely manner, demonstrate that the State's culpability 
went beyond mere negligence. 
In addition, the State's degree of culpability is further heightened by its failure to 
implement controls and policies that ensure preservation of video recordings capturing 
offenses in the prison. As the investigator testified, the prison has no policies regarding 
the retention of video surveillance evidence. R.172:2. Video recordings offer the best 
evidence of what occmTed, are critical to the preparation of a defense, are routinely 
requested as part of discovery, and should be preserved and disclosed to a defendant. 
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When video recordings of an alleged crime are not preserved, a defendant can have 
difficulty defending against the testimony of guards. Moreover, the destruction of this 
type of evidence can raise at least an inference that it must not have suppo1ted the State's 
case, thereby undennining the integrity of our system if the prosecution goes fo1ward 
without the destroyed evidence. See Handy, 988 N.E.2d at 883. 
For these reasons, the State should have policies in place to retain recordings that 
capture offenses occmTing in prison. Peschel, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47 (where the city 
"utterly failed to have any controls in place to ensure the video recordings from police 
vehicles were adequately preserved," its actions "went beyond mere negligence"); see 
also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212,218 (S.D.N.Y.2003) ("Once a 
paity reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document 
retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the preservation 
ofrelevant documents"). The lack of policies and procedures is evident not only from the 
investigator's testimony, but also from the mishandling of this imp01tant piece of 
evidence and fmther demonstrates the State's culpability. 
The trial court acknowledged that the State was negligent, but thought it was not 
"neglige[nt] in a high degree," because the State's failure to preserve the video was "born 
out of a multitude of factors and the fact that many personnel are involved in a setting 
such as a prison control unit." R.137. But the fact that "many personnel are involved" 
emphasizes the need for policies and controls regarding the retention or destruction of 
videos that record an alleged crime. Further, as the tiial court indicated, it is "difficult, if 
not impossible" to understand why the State did not preserve the recording. R.136. And, 
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as the comi pointed out, it would be more likely for the recording to be preserved if it 
c01Toborated Hansen's testimony and more likely to be destroyed if it did not. R.136. The 
State's failure to preserve this material evidence along with its failure to adopt policies 
for preserving this type of evidence highlights the State's culpability and shows that it 
went beyond "mere negligence." Moreover, the destruction of a recording of an incident 
at the prison is not an isolated event as evidenced by the fact that the video of a prison 
incident that gave rise to criminal charges was also destroyed in another case before this 
Court, State v. Mohamud, Case No. 20120844-SC. See People v. Sweeney, 859 N.Y.S.2d 
898, 2008 WL 451436 at *5 (Albany City Ct. 2008) (unpublished) ("In order to assess 
the degree of[] fault [with regard to the State's failure to preserve discoverable 
evidence], the Court must consider the fact that this case is not an isolated incident."). 
The third rule 16 factor, the culpability of the State, weighs heavily in favor of a due 
process violation. 
And finally, the fourth rule 16 factor- whether the defense investigation would 
have changed the outcome-weighs in favor of a due process violation. The charges in 
this case were not filed until several months after the incident; by then, the video had 
been destroyed. Prison surveillance footage is a unique fom1 of evidence that is under the 
State's control. A defendant cannot discover or obtain surveillance footage on her own if 
the State destroys it. In this case, the guard looked at the video shortly after the incident; 
at that point, the importance of the video had already been identified. The investigator 
also recognized that the video was impo1iant and requested it. The defendant, on the other 
hand, had no access to the video, no ability to create her own video, and no way to obtain 
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the video once charges had been filed. Hence, defense investigation would not have 
changed the outcome. 
All of the rule 16 factors therefore demonstrate that the State was required to 
preserve and disclose the video recording of the alleged incident, and that its failure to do 
so violated state due process. As DeJesus argued below, these factors alone demonstrate 
that the State's failure to preserve material evidence to which DeJesus was entitled under 
rule 16 violated due process. R.96; see Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (reversing where prosecutor 
violated rule 16 in failing to provide inculpatory evidence to the defense); see also 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,144. 
2. The record shows that there is a reasonable probability the destroyed 
video recording would be exculpatory. 
Although DeJesus need not demonstrate "a reasonable probability that lost or 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory" as a threshold or for reversal, when a 
defendant does demonstrate a reasonable probability that destroyed evidence would be 
exculpatory, two additional factors are considered. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 144. 
These factors are: "(1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree of 
prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and imp01iance of the missing 
evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining 
evidence." Id. The trial comi erred by interpreting "reasonable probability" to require a 
defendant to present extrinsic proof that the video was in fact exculpatory, thereby 
incorporating a standard that is stricter than due process allows, and in disregarding the 
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nature of the defense and the evidence presented by the defense in determining whether 
there was a reasonable probability that the video "would be exculpatory." Id. The trial 
court's ruling that DeJesus did not establish a reasonable probability that the recording 
would be exculpatory (R. 135, 133-38) is incorrect. 5 
5 Tiedemann indicates that a state due process violation based on destruction of 
evidence can be found based only on a balancing of the rule 16 factors. The second part 
of the test outlined in Tiedemann-whether the defendant demonstrated "a reasonable 
probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory," and a balancing of the 
two additional factors-seems aimed more towards the consequences of the due process 
violation rather than whether a due process violation occurred. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 
49, '1!44. Such an approach is consistent with the approach taken by other courts that 
conduct a two-part state due process balancing test. The first part assesses whether the 
government violated due process in not preserving and disclosing the evidence whereas 
the second part assesses the consequences of the violation. See, e.g. Hammond, 569 A.2d 
at 86 ( determining that government breached its duty to preserve evidence then 
considering the culpability of the government, the importance of the evidence, and the 
existence of cumulative evidence in determining the consequences of the breach); 
Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331-32 (concluding that State's failure to preserve videotape of 
field sob1iety tests violated due process then "look[ing] to the degree of culpability on the 
pati of the state, the importance of the evidence lost, the prejudice suffered by the 
accused, and the evidence of guilt adduced at the trial or hearing" in determining the 
appropriate consequence); Morales, 657 A.2d at 728 (indicating that remedy for due 
process violation is fashioned to "serve the interests of justice" and depends on "the 
materiality of the unpreserved evidence and the degree of prejudice to the accused"); see 
also United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319 (2nd Cir. 1975) ("Where disclosable 
evidentiary material which came into the possession of the Government has been lost or 
destroyed, and is unavailable to the defense for that reason, the standards for determining 
whether sanctions should be imposed on the Government ... depend on the extent of the 
Government's culpability for the loss or destruction and the amount of the prejudice to 
the defense which resulted."). But regardless of whether the second pati of the 
Tiedemann test applies to consequences or provides additional factors for determining 
whether state due process was violated, the term "reasonable probability" could not have 
been meant to require a defendant to actually prove that the destroyed evidence was 
exculpatory in order to obtain relief because, among other things, such a requirement 
would be difficult if not impossible to meet and would obviate the state due process 
protection. 
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When evidence is destroyed before a defendant is afforded the opp01iunity to 
examine it, a defendant is precluded from proving its exculpatory content. See Delisle, 
648 A.2d at 643; Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331; Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87. "When evidence 
has been lost or remains untested 'there is often no way for a defendant to ascertain the 
true extent of its exculpatory nature."' State v. Bailey, 475 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Vt. 1984). 
Thus, rather than requiring a higher quantum of proof, which would preclude most 
defendants from meeting their initial burden and relieve comis from their balancing 
duties, fundamental fairness requires a low initial burden that encourages thoughtful 
balancing. See id. ( concluding that "when evidence is not available a defendant does not 
have to prove the evidence would be exculpatory but must show only a 'reasonable 
possibility' that it would have been favorable" (emphasis added)). 
This Court has already recognized that "[b ]ecause of the difficulties posed by the 
record's silence in cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, it 
seems appropriate in such instances to place the burden on the State to persuade a court 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense." Knight 734 P.2d at 921 (emphasis 
added). Hence, even if the videotape were inculpatory, the State would have had an 
obligation under Knight and rule 16 to preserve and disclose it. Failure to do so would 
have required the State to persuade the court that failure to disclose the video "did not 
unfairly prejudice the defense." Id. Requiring the defendant to actually prove the 
exculpatory nature of the video is thus inconsistent with Knight, misreads Tiedemann, 
and would do away with the state due process protection. 
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The difficulties of establishing that destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory 
show that the trial court's stringent requirement that DeJesus prove that the video was 
exculpatory misinterpreted this Court's use of the term "reasonable probability" in 
Tiedemann. A "reasonable probability" is not an actuality or even a reasonable certainty. 
See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919-20. Instead, " '[a] reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Id. at 920 ( citation omitted). Utah 
cases law make it clear that a reasonable probability occurs "at some point substantially 
short of the 'more probable than not' portion of the spectrum," Knight, 734 P.2d at 920, 
and therefore does not require proof that the destroyed evidence was in fact exculpatory. 
Utah appellate comis have recognized that the reasonable probability test does not 
require a defendant to prove that it is "more likely than not" that the destroyed evidence 
contains exculpatory evidence. See State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i]20, 63 P.3d 56; see 
also Worthen, 2008 UT App 23 at i]28. The reasonable probability test "elude[s] 
quantification" and its precise limits cannot be defined, but this Comi has articulated its 
place relative to that of other standards. Blake, 2002 UT l 13,i]20. So while this standard 
is elusive, we know that "reasonable probability" falls "somewhere between 'mere 
possibility' and 'more likely than not" and that it falls significantly below "reasonable 
certainty." Id. 
By contrast with "reasonable probability," "reasonable certainty," which "lies on 
the more stringent side of 'more likely than not,"' is deliberately chosen for specific 
circumstances where there is a need for more stringent proof. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i]20. 
But even when the much more stringent "reasonable certainty" test is applied, our case 
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law does not require absolute proof that the evidence is exculpatory, as was required by 
the trial comt here. Instead, our case law recognizes that despite the imposition of the 
stringent "reasonable ce1tainty" test, a defendant can show that there is a reasonable 
certainty that therapy records include exculpatory evidence by alleging specific facts 
rather than generalizations and by providing "infom1ation from outside sources" that 
might supp01t the defense. Blake, 2002 UT 113, i122; Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, i128. 
For example, the defendant in Worthen met the more stringent reasonable ce1tainty 
test by identifying the focus of his defense and providing "information from outside 
sources" that suppo1ted that defense. Id. at ili128-30. Rather than requiring absolute proof 
of the exculpatory content of the records to establish a reasonable certainty, the court 
focused on the nature of the defense and reasoned that the defendant had established a 
reasonable ce1tainty that the records contained exculpatory evidence where the defense 
alleged that the victim made up the criminal allegations because she hated her parents, 
the request contained specific dates of therapy sessions, and the victim's mother claimed 
to be present for at least one session. Id. at ,i,i29-30. Hence, under an even more stringent 
"reasonable certainty" standard, a defendant can establish a reasonable certainty that 
exculpatory evidence exists without actually proving that the evidence is exculpatory. 
Blake, 2002 UT 113, i122; see also State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d 79 (holding 
that defendant demonstrated a reasonable certainty that records contained exculpatory 
evidence in light of the focus of the defense and information from outside sources 
supporting the defense). 
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Even when the more stiingent "reasonable certainty" test is employed, a trial judge 
does not weigh the evidence or assess credibility in deciding whether the defendant has 
shown a reasonable certainty that records contain exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., id. 
Instead, our courts have looked to the nature of the defense and specific "information 
from outside sources" in reaching a decision that the defendant has established a 
reasonable certainty that records contained exculpatory evidence. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 
il30. The application of the "reasonable certainty" test in these cases further demonstrates 
that in this case, the trial court erred in applying a heightened test to its "reasonable 
probability" determination that disregarded the focus of the defense; disregarded or 
disbelieved "information from outside sources," including testimony of defense witnesses 
and inconsistent testimony from the guard; and disregarded the circumstances of the case. 
Proper application of a "reasonable probability" standard shows that the trial court 
erred in concluding that DeJesus did not show a reasonable probability that the recording 
would be evidence. At the very least, the focus of the defense and "information from 
outside sources" should be considered because they can establish the more stringent 
reasonable certainty. See Blake, 2002 UT 113, il22. It also makes sense to consider "the 
type of evidence and the available technology, as well as the circumstances of the case," 
and whether no equivalent form of evidence exists when assessing whether there is a 
reasonable probability that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory. Youngblood, 488 
U.S. at 71 (Blackmun, J. , dissenting). 
Moreover, some courts entertain a presumption when circumstances waiTant it that 
the lost or destroyed evidence would have been favorable to the defense. See, e.g., 
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Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331-32 (remanding with directions that hearing officer presume that 
the destroyed videotape would have been favorable to the defendant). This is consistent 
with the trial court's recognition that a videotape of an alleged incident in the prison is 
more likely to be destroyed if it is inconsistent with the testimony of the state's witness. 
R.135-36. Hence, in determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, courts should also consider whether the 
circumstances create an inference that the lost or destroyed evidence would have been 
favorable to the defense. 
Application of these factors demonstrates that the trial court was inc01Tect in 
concluding that there was no showing of a reasonable probability that the videotape of the 
incident would be exculpatory. First, the defense focused on the location of Khan dming 
the incident; the trial court depicted the defense as, "the striking of Hansen was either an 
accident while defendant was trying to engage in combat with Khan or that the striking 
was justified or occmTed for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it was 
done to inflict injury intentionally or knowingly." R.134. The video would have shown 
whether the defense claim that Khan was directly behind Hansen and engaging in 
aggressive behavior was accurate. 
Information from outside sources further demonsh·ates that there is a reasonable 
probability that the video would be exculpatory. See supra at 36-37. As previously 
outlined, Ataata observed the incident and testified consistently with DeJesus's defense 
that Khan was on Hansen's back, trying to swing at DeJesus, and did not back away. 
R.175:17-19. At least part of Hansen's testimony was also consistent with DeJesus's 
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defense since he testified that Khan was on his back. R.70. This testimony from outside 
sources that was consistent with DeJesus's defense demonstrates that there was a 
reasonable probability that the video would be exculpatory. 
Although the trial judge gave "little credit" to Ataata's testimony and indicated 
that he did not find the testimony believable (R.134), that was not the proper inquiry. In 
fact, the judge recognized that that "[a] jury may well conclude differently," that the 
"court's belief at this point is of course irrelevant to what may be presented at trial," and 
that "[t]he court is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by the defendant at a 
trial." R.135. In fact, the comi was correct that its belief was irrelevant since it was for 
the jury, not the court, to decide who to believe in light of the conflicting evidence about 
the incident. Moreover, DeJ esus had the right to present a meaningful defense and 
Ataata's testimony, coupled with the recording of the incident, would have been the way 
in which she presented her defense had the State preserved the video as required. 
Nevertheless, the comi entirely discounted Ataata's testimony without recognizing that 
other sources corroborated the defense and emphasized the importance of the video since 
it would have shown definitively who was accurately describing the incident. Just as the 
judge in Worthen could not discount the information from other sources that supported 
the defense in assessing whether there was a reasonable ce1iainty that the records 
contained exculpatory evidence, this trial judge could not make credibility detem1inations 
and instead should have been focusing simply on the nature of the defense and whether 
there was information from other sources in deciding whether there was a reasonable 
probability that the video contained info1mation favorable to the defense. 
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The existence of this specific evidence supporting the defense from two different 
sources, coupled with the focus of the defense, shows that this evidence was sufficient to 
establish the more stringent reasonable ce1iainty standard outlined in Carda!!, Blake, and 
other cases. Since that standard is much higher, requiring that the existence of 
exculpatory evidence be more probable than not, the focus of the defense and the 
existence of specific evidence supporting that defense met the lower reasonable 
probability standard. 
Although this should be enough to establish a reasonable probability, there is more 
in this case. The type of evidence destroyed, the availability of technology and the ease 
with which the video could have been preserved, the fact that the video was in the State's 
possession and was viewed by the guard, and the fact that it depicted the incident and was 
not cumulative all fmiher demonstrate the need for this evidence as well as that there was 
more than a "mere possibility" that the evidence was exculpatory. 
The video was mate1ial and critical to this case-it directly filmed the incident and 
would have provided definitive evidence regarding the factual questions that existed. It 
would have been simple to preserve. It is "difficult, if not impossible" to understand why 
the prison would not maintain a pennanent recording of the incident. R.136. In fact, 
"[t]he destruction came about by action or inaction, of the Department of Corrections 
personnel in failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the time of the 
incident." R.135. The evidence was not cumulative and no other evidence of this nature 
was available. And, the destruction of the video had a "pervasive" effect on this case. See 
generally State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, ,r86, 152 P.3d 321 (recognizing that there is a 
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reasonable probability that an en-or affected the outcome of a trial where the error is 
pervasive). Moreover, as some courts have recognized, the destruction of evidence 
material to the case raises at least an inference that it must have been favorable to the 
defense. Similarly, the trial court in this case recognized that "[i]f the recording showed 
exactly as Hansen said, ce1tainly it would seem to the comt that common sense would 
indicate that recording would be retained," but "if the recording supported some other 
factual situation than the one Hansen describes," it would be more likely to be destroyed. 
R.135-36. All of these considerations combine to establish more than a "mere possibility" 
that the recording would be exculpatory. The trial court therefore e1Ted in concluding that 
DeJesus did not demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the recording 
would be exculpatory. 
3. The reason for the destruction and the prejudice to DeJesus require 
that this case be dismissed. 
In cases like this "where a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost 
or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, ... it [is] necessary to require consideration 
of the following: (1) the reason for the destruction or loss of the evidence, including the 
degree of negligence or culpability on the part of the State; and (2) the degree of 
prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality and impmtance of the missing 
evidence in the context of the case as a whole, including the strength of the remaining 
evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if44. While these factors demonstrate that state due 
process was violated, they also show that dismissal is required. See supra at 33 n.5.; see 
also Morales, 657 A.2d at 728-29 (indicating that consequences of state due process 
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violation are guided by the interests of justice and depend on the prejudice to defendant 
caused by the destruction of evidence). Ultimately, if it would be fundamentally unfair to 
try the defendant without the missing evidence, dismissal is required. Ferguson, 2 
S.W.2d at 917. 
1. The video was both material and important to DeJesus's defense, and 
the state's destruction of the video was prejudicial. 
The State's destruction of the surveillance video prejudiced DeJesus and precluded 
her from presenting a meaningful defense. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, if44. "[B]y its 
very nature," video footage is "unique" and important. State v. Merriman, 410 S.W.3d 
779, 792-93 (Tenn. 2013); Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 n. 5 (Alaska 1978) 
("[P]reservation of photographs and other real evidence is of special importance to 
defense preparation."). Video recordings are the best evidence of the circumstances 
sunounding the offense and the events that unfolded. Videos offer an objective account 
of the events, unmaned by the fading memories and biases of witnesses. When a case is 
based on testimonial evidence alone, video recordings play a vital role and the video's 
loss may be particularly prejudicial. See Merriman, 410 S.W.3d at 792-93 (indicating that 
the defendant was denied his right to a fair tlial where the destroyed "video was a 
recording of the alleged offenses as they occurred, was probative of the issues 
smTounding [the] ... charges, and was the only non-testimonial evidence"). By contrast 
if the video "would have been merely cumulative" of other evidence the defendant may 
suffer little prejudice. Morales, 657 A.2d at 727. 
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Here, the surveillance footage was material and imp01tant to DeJesus's defense 
and its loss significantly prejudiced her. The trial court discounted the degree of 
prejudice, curs01ily explaining that "[b]ecause ... defendant has [not] shown any 
reasonable, believable probability the recording showed what defendant claims," there 
would be no "prejudice by its unavailability." R.136. This failed to consider the 
impo1tance of the video and its centrality to the issue of guilt in this case. 
In order to convict, the jury had to find that DeJesus "commit[ted] assault, 
intending to cause bodily injury." Utah Code §76-5-102.5; see also Utah Code §76-5-102 
However, DeJesus would be entitled to an acquittal if she did not intend to cause the 
guard bodily injury or "reasonably believed" that force was necessary to defend herself 
against Khan's "imminent use of unlawful force." See Utah Code §76-2-402; Com. v. 
Fowlin, 676 A.2d 665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (pointing out that when defendant acted in 
self-defense, "he cannot be held culpable under transfeITed intent doctiine for intentional 
crime"). Here, the defense was that DeJesus did not intentionally strike Hansen and if she 
did make contact with him, she inadvertently did so while defending herself against 
Khan's imminent attack. R.40. 
The State's case was not strong and rested on the guard's testimony. As outlined 
supra at 25, the guard testified inconsistently regarding Khan's location. R.60, 70. 
Although he testified that Khan was a few feet behind him, he also testified on cross-
examination, Khan was "on [Hansen's] back" and he "d[id]n't know exactly where she 
was" as he "could not see" Khan. R.70. Hansen later claimed at the evidentiary hearing 
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that the video showed Khan "was disengaged" and was about four to six feet behind 
Hansen when DeJesus kicked him. R.175 :3. 
This testimony alone demonstrates the significance of the video-the jury could 
have viewed it and detennined for themselves whether Khan was on Hansen's back or a 
few feet behind him. They also would not have been left only with Hansen's memory of 
what he thought the video showed- that memory could have been clouded by his own 
involvement in the incident, his heightened emotional state when viewing the video 
immediately after the incident and a multitude of other factors including the lighting and 
other conditions under which he viewed the video. In order to advance a meaningful 
defense, DeJesus needed the video, not just the guard 's depiction of it. 
The recording would have shown the alleged altercation and Khan's position 
relative to DeJesus and the guard. The quality of the video is not in question and it was 
not cumulative of any evidence produced. Its loss prevented the jury from viewing the 
events as they actually occurred, which would have allowed them to draw their own 
conclusions and determine if DeJesus unintentionally struck Hansen while reasonably 
defending herself against Khan's attack. Thus, the video was critical and it was likely that 
it was outcome determinative. 
The video recording was also significant because the state's case was built solely 
on Hansen's testimony. "Because no other secondary or substitute evidence was 
available, the case was reduced to a credibility contest" between Hansen, Ataata, and 
DeJesus, had she elected to testify at trial. Merriman, 410 S.W.2d at 793-94. In the 
absence of the video recording, DeJesus was left with the difficult task of rebutting 
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Officer Hansen's testimony that Khan was several feet away when DeJesus struck him. 
That task was particularly difficult in light of the credibility problems that likely arose 
due to the relationship between DeJesus and Ataata, and their status as prison inmates. 
See Pettit, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1111. "The video camera was an objective witness that bore 
neither the potential pro-defense leanings of the [State's] witnesses nor the credibility 
problems of [DeJesus and Ataata]." Id. 
The video provided the only objective account of the events that transpired and its 
destruction hindered the most accurate detennination of DeJesus's case. By failing to 
preserve the video, the State deprived DeJesus of evidence that critically prejudiced her 
defense and denied her a fair trial in violation of Utah's due process protection. Thus, 
dismissal is required because it would be fundamentally unfair to require her to defend 
herself in the absence of this evidence. 
11. The state's failure to preserve the recording was highly culpable and 
weighs in favor of dismissal. 
The state's failure to preserve the recording went beyond "mere negligence" as 
outlined supra at 28-31. A video that captures an alleged crime is almost always highly 
probative and should be preserved. But when the video captures an incident between a 
guard and an inmate, the video can be critical to the defendant's ability to mount a 
meaningful defense since a jury is likely to believe the testimony of a guard over a felon. 
Id. In this case, both the investigator and Hansen recognized the importance of the video 
immediately after the incident but failed to take adequate steps to ensure that a pe1manent 
copy was produced. Nor did the captain, who could have easily downloaded the video, 
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make a pennanent copy. The unnamed control person likewise should have known the 
importance of the video and followed-up on its preservation. Moreover, the lack of 
policies for preserving videos of incidents in the prison and the fact that the destruction of 
the video is not an isolated occurrence, further demonstrates the State's high degree of 
culpability in failing to preserve this evidence. 6 
In the end, while prejudice to DeJesus alone wan-ants reversal, the State's 
culpability also weighs in favor of dismissing these charges. The ability to preserve the 
recording was within the State's power, it would have required very little effo1t to do so, 
and the failure to ensure that the video was recorded demonstrated utter disregard for 
DeJesus's due process right to discovery and to present a meaningful defense. The trial 
comt's order should therefore be reversed and this case dismissed. 
C. This issue is preserved. 
DeJesus preserved this issue for review. She filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Failure to Preserve Evidence (R.37-44), a reply memorandum after the State responded 
to the Motion to Dismiss (R.78-85), and a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion to Dismiss. R.92-100. Three hearings were held (R.172, 174, 175) and the trial 
court ruled in a memorandum decision. R.126-140. Additionally, DeJesus filed a petition 
for interlocutory review of the order at issue in this case, which the comt of appeals 
6 The State's degree of negligence or culpability involves a legal conclusion. Tiedemann, 
2007 UT 49, ,r12. But even if it were a finding, the comt's determination that there was 
"no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department of Corrections" is clearly erroneous 
since negligence, which the tiial comt recognized, is culpable conduct. 
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denied. R.143-44. DeJesus then pied guilty, specifically preserving her right to appeal 
this ruling. R.153; 173:1, 3-4. 
Throughout, DeJesus argued that the charges against her should be dismissed 
because her state due process rights, as recognized in Teidemann, were violated by the 
State's failure to preserve this evidence. As part of that argument, DeJesus acknowledged 
the holding in Otkovic that "[i]f, as a threshold matter, a defendant can show 'that there is 
"a reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory,"' then the 
trial court is obligated to consider two additional factors." (R.39, quoting Otkovic, 2014 
UT App 58, ,J24). But she also pointed out that "a trial court can find there is a due 
process violation and dismiss the case based on a balancing of the rule 16 factors alone. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at 141." R.94. And she clarified that "a defendant need not make 
any showing before a court must consider" and balance the rule 16 factors, along with the 
factors considered by other states. R.93-95. She further clarified that "[a] balancing of the 
rule 16 factors in [her] case is sufficient to grant her Motion to Dismiss." R.96. 
An issue is preserved when it is "raised directly or indirectly, so long as it is 
'raised to a level of consciousness such that the tiial court can consider it."' Hill v. 
Superior Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. , 2013 UT 60, ,J57, 321 P .3d 1054. Here, DeJ esus raised 
the issue in a timely manner, specifically argued her claim that her state due process 
rights under Tiedemann were violated, pointing out in pait that that Tiedemann did not 
require a threshold showing of reasonable probability and also that the reasonable 
probability test did not require her to prove that the recording "was in fact exculpatory." 
R.94-96, 97. This brought the issue "to a level of consciousness such that the trial comt 
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[ could] consider it," and the trial comi did in fact reach the issue. It therefore is 
preserved. 
Even if DeJesus's claim had not been preserved, however, it could be reviewed 
under the doctrine of exceptional circumstances. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to 
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on 
appeal."' Id. at 8 ( citation omitted). Although it "is used sparingly," the doctrine allows 
review in exceptional situations involving "'rare procedural anomalies."' Id., citing State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). "Such anomalies have included a 
defendant being convicted of something that was no longer a crime, the entry of final 
judgment by a commissioner with no authority, and a major shift in interpretation of 
settled law." State v. Fouse, 2014 UT App 29, ,l18 n.4, 319 P.3d 778; see also State v. 
Harris, 2012 UT 77, ,l24, 289 P.3d 591 , (indicating exceptional circumstances doch·ine 
might allow review "when errors not excepted to are so clearly erroneous and prejudicial 
to the rights of a defendant that an appellate comi will of its own accord take notice 
thereof') ( citation and quotation marks omitted). 
This circumstance, where controlling authority from the court of appeals 
incon-ectly interpreted a decision from this Court, provides such a rare procedural 
anomaly. The parties are required to acknowledge controlling case law and the district 
court ordinarily is required to follow decisions of the court of appeals. Although DeJesus 
argued below that a threshold showing of reasonable probability was not required, even if 
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-she had not, this issue could be reviewed under the doctrine of exceptional circumstances 
because the court of appeals' decision in Otkovic set that standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above, DeJesus respectfully requests that this Comt 
reverse her conviction and dismiss the charges against her. 
SUBMITTED this ·J.] day of September, 2015. 
JOAN C. WATT 
ALEXANDRA S. MCCALLUM 
\VESLEY J. HOW ARD 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
FINAL PRETRIAL 
CF.ANGE OF PLEA 
CONFERENCE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
LISSETTE 
custody: 
PRESENT 
Clerk: 
MARIAN DEJESUS, 
Defendant. 
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rhondam 
Prosecator: MAGEE, COLLEEN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J 
DEFENDANT INFOR!-lATION 
Cate of birth: July 2, 1981 
Sheriff Office#: 248038 
Audio 
Case No: 
Judge: 
Date: 
Tape Number: Courtroom 32 Tape Count: 1:52- 2:01 
CHARGES 
l. ASSAULT BY PRISONER - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/23/2015 Guilty 
Defendant waives time for sentence . 
HE.l\RING 
141400093 FS 
BRUCE LUBECK 
April 23, 2015 
Jury Trial scheduled for April 29, and April 30th is stricken based on plea agreeme~t 
in this case. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ASSAULT BY PRISONER a 3r d Degree Felony, the 
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT i s to begin immediately . 
000148 
Printed: 04/23/15 14:01:53 Page 1 of 2 
Case No: 141400093 Date: Apr 23, 2015 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Frison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison term to run concurrent to any commitments currently serving. 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Department of Corrections Utah State 
Prison - Draper. 
Date: 
0001.49 
Printed: 04/23/15 14 : 01:53 
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ORDER OF CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 20150460-CA 
This case is before the court on Defendant' suggestion for certification filed 
pursuant to rule 43(b)(l) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Based upon the 
affirmative vote of at least four judges of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal is certified for immediate transfer to 
the Utah Supreme Court for determination. 
Dated this \b \taay of July, 2015. 
FOR THE COURT: 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----00000- - --
State of Utah , 
Plaintiff and Appellee , 
v . 
Edgar Tiedemann, 
Defendant and Appellant . 
Third District , Salt Lake 
The Honorable Judith S . Atherton 
No . 021912452 
No. 20050676 
F I L E D 
June 29 , 2007 
Attorneys : Mark L . Shurtleff , Att ' y Gen . , Laura 8. Dupaix, Asst . 
Att ' y Gen . , T . Langdon Fisher , William Kendall , Salt 
Lake City , for plaintiff 
Linda M. Jones , Heidi Buchi, Heather Brereton , 
Patrick W. Corum, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
DURHAM , Chief Justice : 
INTRODUCTION 
~1 tdgar Tiedemann is charged with three counts of murder , 
a fi r st degree felony . This court granted Tiedemann's petition 
for interlocutory appeal from two pretrial orders . First , he 
appealed the pretrial order denying his motion to suppress 
statements a l legedly obtained in violation of t h e state and 
federal constitutions and Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U. S . 436 
(1966 ). Second , Tiedemann appealed the order deny ing his motion 
to dismiss based on the State ' s destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence. 
BACKGROUND 
~2 The State alleges that on November 2 , 1991 Tiedemann 
shot and killed Susan Sessions , Charles Timerberman , and Scott 
Bunnell . 1 Sess i ons, Timerberman, and Bunnell were staying at 
Tiedemann ' s West Valley tra i ler home for the night . Following 
the shootings, the police took Tiedemann into custody where two 
police officers , Detective Ron Edwards and Sergeant Ed Spann, 
questioned h i m about the ki llings . In the course of questioning , 
Tiedemann confessed to the murders. 
q3 The interrogation was videotaped and transcribed in 
part. The officers began the interrogation by reading Tiedemann 
h is Miranda rights . When asked if he understood his rights, 
Tiedemann answered in the affirmative . 2 The officers then asked 
Tiedemann if he understood that he could stop the questioning at 
anytime, to which he responded "ya . " The officers then asked 
Tiedemann if he still wished to speak with them at that time , and 
Tiedemann agreed . When asked by the officers if he was 
intoxicated, Tiedemann stated that he was intoxicated on Toluene, 
a paint thinner . The officers proceeded with the interrogation . 
q4 As t h e officers continued the questioning, they asked 
Tiedemann about the shootings. Specifically, Detective Edwards 
asked, "What happened to [Ms . Sessions)?" Tiedemann answered, "I 
don ' t want to talk about it . " Detective Edwards responded, "You 
don ' t want to talk about it?" and Tiedemann responded, "No . " 
Sergeant Spann, attempted to clarify exactly what Tiedemann did 
not want to talk abou t by asking , "What is it that you don ' t want 
to talk about?" Before Tiedemann responded, Sergeant Spann 
continued with , "You said murders in West Valley, where in West 
Valley?" 
~5 Sergeant Spann tried again to clarify Tiedemann ' s 
response by asking, "[w)hat part do you and what part don't you 
want to talk to us about?" Again , before Tiedemann clarified, 
Detective Edwards asked, "Edgar do you remember me reading [ you 
your) rights earlier and you signing a waiver for us to search 
your home? " Tiedemann answered, "Ya." Detective Edwards 
continued questioning Tiedeman n about the murders . 
q6 During the course of the interrogation , Tiedemann 
stated that he had "all kinds" of "mental problems . " He informed 
the officers of a stroke he had in 1 988 . He told the officers, 
~ Scott Bunnell died in February 2001 due to the injuries he 
sustained on November 2 , 1 991 . Accordingly, with respect to Mr . 
Bunnell, the original charge for attempted murder was changed to 
murder. 
2 Although the transcript of the interrogation recorded 
T~edemann ' s response as being "inaudible," a viewing of the video 
reveals ~hat Tiedemann, with head down and in a muffled tone , 
said "ya." 
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"I think I'm Adolf Hitler." He also claimed that "the devil" 
told him to shoot the victims. At the end of the interrogation, 
Tiedemann affirmed that the police had not threatened him or 
promised anything, but that he made the statements of his own 
free will . The entire interrogation lasted less than one hour . 
j7 The State originally charged Tiedemann with two counts 
of aggravated murder and one count each of attempted aggravated 
murder, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated sexual assault . The 
charges were dismissed seven months later after Tiedemann was 
declared incompetent to stand trial . At that time , the State did 
not anticipate refiling charges because, based on his competency 
evaluation, Tiedemann was unlikely to ever be found competent to 
stand trial . Tiedemann was then civilly committed to the Utah 
State Hospital. 
j8 Two years later, in April 1994, the state evidence 
custodian notified the investigating officer that physical 
evidence from the case would be destroyed unless an objection was 
filed within thirty days. The officer made no objection, and the 
evidence was destroyed. The destroyed evidence included two 
revolvers, a Code R kit , a victim' s wallet, heroin, an audio 
tape, a b l ood specimen, a make- up kit , drug paraphernalia, 
various items of victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment 
found on one victim's bed, a bottle of green liquid, a one gallon 
can of Toluene, . 38 and . 22 caliber bullets , bullet fragments, 
shell casings, hair and saliva sam9les, and gunshot residue from 
Tiedemann and one of the victims . 
~9 Not all of the evidence was destroyed . The evidence 
given to the defense in this proceeding included autopsy photos 
and reports on all three victims, toxicology reports on the 
victims, a rape report from St . Mark's Hospital, photos taken of 
weapons and ammunition, firearm analysis reports, transcripts of 
interviews taken from one of the shooting victims and the sexual 
assaul t victim, witness statements, a videotape of the interview 
with the sexual assault victim, and a videotape and photos of the 
crime scene. 
jl0 In October 2002, the district attorney ' s office was 
notified that Tiedemann was going to be released from the Utah 
State Hospital. The State subsequently recharged h i m with three 
counts of murder , declining to refile the other felony counts. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court found Tiedemann 
competent to stand trial and denied his pretrial motions to 
suppress his testimony and to dismiss the case due to destruction 
of evidence. This court granted Tiedemann's petition for 
interlocutory appeal from both rul ings . We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code section 78 - 2-2 (3) (h) (2002) . 
3 No. 20050676 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ill In reviewing the trial court's denial of Tiedemann's 
Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements, we review the 
trial court ' s factual findings for clear error and we review its 
conclusions of law for correctness. State v . Trover, 910 P.2d 
1182 , 1186 (Utah 1995). 
il2 Whether the State's destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law 
that we review for correctness. "However, because this question 
requires application of facts in the record to the due process 
standard, we incorporate a clearly erroneous standard for the 
necessary subsidiary factual determinations." Chen v. Stewart , 
2004 UT 82, i 25, 100 P.3d 1177. 
ANALYSIS 
~13 This case presents two issues : first , whether 
Tiedemann validly waived his Miranda rights and , if so, whether 
he subsequently, unambiguously invoked his right to remain 
si l ent ; and second , whether the destruct ion of evidence in this 
case violated Tiedemann's due process rights under the state and 
federal constitutions. The court addresses these issues as 
f o l lows : Part I of this opinion treats the Motion to Suppress 
the Confession as it relates to (A) whe t her Tiedemann waived his 
right to remain silent, and (B) whether Tiedemann subsequently 
reinvoked his right to remain silent; Part II deals with the 
destruction of evidence. This opinion contains the majority as 
to Part IA . The majority opinion of the court as to Part IB is 
contained in the separate opinion of Justice Durrant, joined by 
Justices Nehring and Parrish . The dissenting view in Part IB of 
this opinion is mine alone . Part II of this opinion contains the 
majority view of the court on the destruction of evidence 
question . In a separate opinion, Justice Wilkins dissents as to 
Part IB and as to Part II . 
I . MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION 
~14 We first address whether the district court was correct 
in denying Tiedemann ' s request to suppress his confession. 
Tiedemann argues that he never gave a voluntary waiver of his 
right to remain silent, but rather , that the police took 
advantage of his known mental impairment to improperly evoke a 
waiver and confession from him . Tiedemann also argues that , even 
if he gave a valid initial waiver, he later unambiguously raised 
his right to remain silent, and the officers failed to honor that 
request in violation of his due process rights . 
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~15 This court addressed the threshold requirements for a 
valid waiver of Miranda rights and a subsequent invocation of 
those rights i n State v . Leyva , 951 P . 2d 738 (Utah 1997) . Leyva 
firmly established that " (t]he questions of waiver of Miranda 
rights and of postwaiver invocat ion of those rights are entirely 
separate." Id. at 743 . We therefore address Tiedemann's init ial 
waiver and the subsequent raising of his right to remain silent 
separately . If the initial waiver was not valid, the statements 
mus t be suppressed. If , however , the initial waiver was valid, 
we must determine if Tiedemann later validly invoked his right to 
remain silent. 
A. Tiedemann's Initial Waiver Was Valid 
~16 With regard to the initial waiver of Miranda rights , 
this court has noted, in accordance with federal case law, that a 
"'heavy burden ' rests on law enforcement officers ' to demonstrate 
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived' his 
Miranda rights ." Leyva , 951 P . 2d at 743 (quoting Miranda v . 
Arizona, 384 U. S . 436 , 475 (1966)) . The burden therefore rests 
on the State to show that a suspect ' s waiver of Miranda rights 
was clear and unambiguous, as well as voluntary. 
~17 In this case, the inte rrogating officers read Tiedemann 
his rights and asked him if he understood them. Tiedemann, 
a lthough appearing distant and with his head lowered, answered in 
the affirmative . Further, Tiedemann responded in the affi rmative 
to each of the following questions : (1) "Do you understand that 
you can stop this questioning a t anytime?" (2) "If you cannot 
afford an attorney, we will provide one for you . Do you 
understand that?" and (3) ''Do you still wish to speak to us at 
this time?" 
~18 In its Memorandum Decision , the district court 
concluded that the officers did not use coercive tact ics to gain 
the Miranda rights waiver . Having reviewed the transcript and 
video of the interrogation , we agree . The officers did not use 
"false friend11 or "half truth11 tactics. They made no threats or 
promises . The interrogation was less than one hour in length . 
The officers did not deny any special requests by the defendant . 
We could not find a single instance in which the officers 
mis t reated Tiedemann or acted unethically in any way . Although 
Tiedemann was admittedly intoxicated at t he time and was later 
found to be incompetent to stand trial, his mental condition 
alone, absent some abuse by the officers, is not enough to render 
his waiver invalid. See Colorado v . Connelly , 479 U.S. 157, 167 
(1986) ("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to 
the finding that a confession is not ' voluntary ' within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . "); 
State v. Rettenberaer, 1999 UT 80, ~ 17, 984 P . 2d 1009 ("Although 
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. a determination of i nvol untariness cannot be predicated 
solely upon a defendant ' s mental stat e , his mental state is 
re l evant to the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally 
coercive police tactics ." (int ernal quotation marks omitted ) ) . 
~[19 Because Tiedemann' s waiver was clear and unambiguous , 
and because he was not coerced in any way , we conclude that 
Tiedemann effectively waived his Miranda rights . 
B. Tiedemann Unambiguou sly Reasserted 
His Right to Remain Silent 
,20 Because Tiedemann validly waived h is Miranda rights, in 
order for this court to reverse , I believe we must conclude that 
his later attempt to invoke his right to remain silent was 
unambiguous . The right to termi nate questioning is a " critical 
safeguard" of the right to remain silent guaran teed by the Fifth 
Amendment . 3 Michigan v . Mosley , 423 U. S . 96 , 103 (1975) . In 
Miranda , t he United States Supreme Court underscored the 
importance of a suspect ' s right to end an interrogation and 
provided general operational gui dance when it stated that 
quest i oning must stop once a suspect " indicates in any manner , at 
any time . . du r ing question ing, that he wishes to remain 
silent . " Miranda v . Arizona , 384 U. S . 436, 473-7 4 (1966) ; see 
also Mosley, 423 U.S . at 100. 
~21 The more difficult question, one left unanswered in 
Miranda , is how law enforcement officials are to know when a 
suspect has given a sufficient "indication" of a wish to remain 
silent . The United States Supreme Court answered this quest i on 
in Davis v . United States , 512 U. S . 452 (1994) . Mr . Davis was 
accused of beating a sailor to death with a poo l cue a f ter the 
sailor had reneged on a billiards wager . Id . at 454 . After 
waiving his Miranda rights and submitting to an hour and a half 
of interrogation , Mr . Davis mused , " Maybe I should tal k to a 
lawyer. " Id . at 455 . The Court concluded that this statement 
was too equivocal to serve as an invocation of Mr . Davis ' right 
to counsel . Id. at 462 . The Court held that a suspect ' s 
reassertion of the right to counse l " ' requires , at a minimum, 
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an 
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney .' " Id . 
at 459 (quot i ng McNeil v . Wisconsin, 501 U. S . 171 , 178 (1991)) . 
Mr. Davis ' choice of the word "maybe" injected sufficient 
3 As t h is court noted in Leyva , because we have never 
established t he ex i stence of Miranda protections under Lhe Utah 
Constitution, issues concerning Miranda are a nalyzed us i ng 
federal law and the provisions of the United States Constitution . 
Leyva , 951 P . 2d at 743 . 
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equivocation into his comment to allow the officers to continue 
quest i oning him. 
~22 I measure Tiedemann ' s statement "I don ' t want to ta l k 
about it" against the core Davis test as modified to encompass 
the right to remain silent . I f ind it impossible to extract 
ambiguity from the following critical question and answer 
exchange between Detective Edwards and Tiedemann: 
Det . Edwards : What happened to [Ms . 
Sessions]? 
Tiedemann : I don't want to talk about it . 
Det . Edwards : You don ' t want to talk about 
i t ? 
Tiedemann : No . 
123 I find Tiedemann's statement, "I don ' t want to tal k 
about it," and subsequent confirmation of his desire not to talk 
about it an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. 
Contrary to the view expressed by Justice Wilkins , I believe that 
this pivotal exchange between Detective Edwards and Tiedemann 
clearly passed the Davis test. The law cannot deprive defendants 
of their constitutional rights based on failure to use precise 
terminology. Officers need to be alert to various statements and 
behaviors expressed by defendants that meet the required 
threshold of clarity . In my view , Tiedemann met his burden to 
unambiguously invoke his constitutional right to remain silent 
with his statement "I don ' t want to talk about i t," followed by 
repeated silence in respo~se to subsequent questions . 
~24 What remains arobiguous, however, is the scope of 
Tiedemann' s invocation. The antecedent o f the pronoun "it" is 
unc l ear. "It" could refer to "what happened to [Ms. Sessions];" 
or "it 11 could refer to "[t]he murders out there at West Valley," 
a response Tiedemann made to a question only moments before the 
exchange quoted above; or "it 11 could refer to all of the events 
related to the murders . The United States Supreme Court has 
ext ended to criminal suspects " [t)hrough the exercise of [this) 
option to terminate questioning 11 the right to "control the t i me 
at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the 
duration of the interrogation . 11 Mosley , 423 U.S . at 103- 04. I 
recognize that interrogating officers who know tha t a suspect has 
reclaimed his or her right to remain silent but do not know the 
scope of the reclamat ion have a difficult line to wa l k. The 
difficulty arises because question s poseo by interrogators in 
this settir.g will seldom elicit answers t h at c larify the scope of 
the suspect ' s right to remain silen~ without also including 
i nculpatory statements . This p r oblem may be solved by 
disqualifying from cons i deration any inculpatory statements made 
in response to questions posed by interrogators who are in the 
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process of attempting to clarify the scope of a reasserted right 
to remain silent. Such a rule will relieve law enforcement of 
the daunting task of formulating questions that would clarify the 
scope of the Miranda invocation but not invite inculpatory 
statements . 
!25 Given Tiedemann ' s unambiguous invocation of his right 
to remain silent, but accompanied by ambiguity as to the scope of 
such an invocation, I conclude that the police officers were 
entitled either to stop their interrogation completely or to 
properly seek clarification regarding the scope of Tiedemann's 
i nvocation. There fore, their question "What don ' t you want to 
talk about?" 4 was legitimate . However, on the two occasions 
Tiedemann was asked to clarify what "i t " was that he did not want 
to talk about , he was denied the opportunity to answer . In the 
fi rst instance , Sergeant Spann asked Tiedemann two questions at 
once , " What is it that you don't want to talk about?" and "You 
said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?" Tiedemann 
answered only the second question regarding the location of the 
murders. In the second instance, Sergeant Spann asked Tiedemann 
"[w]hat part do you and what part don ' t you want to talk to us 
abou t ?", but before Tiedemann answered, Detective Edwards asked, 
" Edgar[ ,] do you remember me reading you[r] rights earlier and 
you signing a waiver for us to search your home?" Tiedemann 
answered only Detective Edward's question, and Detective Edwards 
continued asking Tiedemann about the shootings . 
!26 I agree with Justice Wilkins that " the officers were 
careful to inquire as to what Tied emann did, and did not, want to 
talk about . " Infra! 61 . But, in my view, the officers ' actions 
demonstrated that they recognized that Tiedemann wished to invoke 
his right to remain silent. When the ir careful inquiry failed to 
eli c it clarity regarding the scope of Tiedemann's invocation, 
Justice Wilkins concludes, albeit based on his view that 
Tiedemann ' s invocation was ambiguous , that "the officers properly 
continued questioning." Id . The better conclusion, in my view, 
is that the officers should have respected Tiedemann' s invocation 
and ceased their interrogation when their attempts to clarify the 
scope of the invocation were unsuccessful . 
!27 With respect to the pauses following questions posed by 
the officers during the interrogation as described by Justice 
~\J ilk.ins , I agree that the "of ficers al lowed ample time for Mr. 
Tiedemann to respond" and that he "failed to do so ." Infra! 63. 
In my view, however, Tiedemann's failure to respond underscored 
his unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. 
The transcript mista kenly substitutes "why" for "what . " 
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t28 I also wish to comment on the majority ' s interpretation 
of the word "it" in Tiedemann ' s statement "I don ' t want to talk 
about it . " As amply illustrated by the fact that there are three 
separate opinions on this particular issue , I think thi s court ' s 
ability to accurately determine the meaning of the pronoun "it" 
is limited . In addition , I believe that the majority ' s 
instruction to the district court to retroactively apply its 
i nterpretation through a systematic question-by-question parsing 
of the interrogation transcript will be difficult and confusing. 5 
129 Following Tiedemann ' s invocation of his right to remain 
silent and before the officers continued their interrogation , 
the officers should have clarified what , if anythi ng, Tiedemann 
was willing to talk about . Having failed to do so , the officers 
were not , in my view, entitled to continue their interrogation. 
Because I conclude that Ti edemann was denied the opportunity to 
clarify the scope of his unequivocal invocat ion of his Miranda 
rights , I also conclude that all of Tiedemann ' s interrogation 
subsequent to his statement "I don ' t want to talk about i t " 
should be suppressed, and therefor e dissent from the opinion of 
Justice Durrant for the majority of the court on this question . 
II. DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE 
130 Tiedemann argues that the State ' s destruction of 
evidence is a violation of Federal Due Process under the Fifth 
Amendment because the evidence may have been exculpatory, no 
comparable evidence sti ll exists , and the destruction was done i n 
bad faith. Tiedemann therefore asks that the trial court ruling 
be reversed and the charges dismissed . 
t31 In the alternative , Tiedemann asks this court to look 
to article I , section 7 of the Utah Constitution and adopt an 
analysis that considers several factors, including the State ' s 
culpability in destroying the evidence , the significance of the 
evidence destroyed, and the prejudice of the destruction to the 
defendant . 
For example, the majority opinion would admit Tiedemann ' s 
answer to the question "Why did you shoot them? " found on page 3 
of the transcript , because the question "did not reference a 
particular victim." Infra t 56 . However , the same question, 
when asked on page 34 of the transcript would not be admitted 
because it becomes clear from Tiedemann's answer, "I don ' t know," 
and the very next question, "Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck 
then?" that the officers were referencing all three of the 
victims in the prior question. I question the wisdom of 
requiring the trial court to undertake this sort of linguistic 
interpretation. 
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A. State Constitu tional Standard 
~32 Tiedemann ' s brief in this matter c l early raises and 
extensively briefs state law claims . The State argues that 
Tiedemann failed to preserve his state law arguments before the 
trial court. The State further contends : 
This Court should also decline to 
address defendant ' s state constitutional 
claim because he has not adequatel y developed 
it using " historical a nd textual evidence , 
sister state l aw, and policy arguments in the 
form of economic and sociological materials 
to assist [ the Court) in arriving at a proper 
interpretation of the provision in question. u 
Society of Seoarationists , Inc. v. Whitehead, 
870 P . 2d 916 , 92 1 n . 6 (Utah 1993) . Wh ile 
defendant does cite to sister state law, he 
fails to analyze his claim within " the unique 
context in wh i ch Utah ' s constitution 
developed . u Indeed, he does not even mention 
that the language of the federal and state 
due process clauses are i dent ical or explain 
wh y , given that circumstance , the clauses 
should be interpreted differently . 
(first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bobo , 803 P . 2d 
1268 , 1272 n . 5 (Utah Ct . App . 1990)). We have quoted the State ' s 
argument at length because we wish to address what we view as a 
fundamental misconception of the logic of i~d proper approach to 
state constitutional law development . 
133 First , the pre servation argument is clearly 
inapplicable here . The State concedes in its brief that 
Tiedemann did in fact request that the trial court decide the 
question as a matter of state law, and the trial court ' s 
memorandum decision indicates as much . Second , the State ' s 
position that the analysis of federal constitutional provisions 
constitutes t he default interpretive stance of this court vis- a -
vis state law is not correct . The fact that the state and 
f ederal constitutional language is identical does not require a 
claimant to create some threshold for independent ana l ysis of the 
state language . This court , not the United States Supreme Court , 
has t he authority and obligation to i n te rpret Utah ' s 
constitutional guarantees , including the scope of due process, 
and we owe f ederal law no more deference in that regard than we 
do sister state interpretat ion of identical state language . See , 
e.a ., State v . DeBoov , 2000 UT 32 , ~ 12, 996 P . 2d 546 
(recogniz ing that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Fourth Amendment contain ide ntica l language , but stating 
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that the court "will not hesitate t o give the Utah Constitution a 
di f ferent construction where doing so will more appropriately 
protect the r i gh ts of this state ' s c itizen s ") . Furthermore, it 
is part of the inherent logic of federa l i s m that stat e law be 
interpreted independently and p rior to consider ation of fed eral 
ques t ions . Hans A . Linde , First Things First : Redi s c overing the 
States ' Bills of Riahts , 9 U. Balt L . Rev . 379 , 383- 84 (1980) ; 
see also West v . Thomson Newspapers , 872 P . 2d 999 , 1006 (Utah 
1994) ("By looking first to state consti t utional principle s , we 
a l so act in accordance with the original purpose of t he federal 
system . ") . This is so because the State cannot , conc eptually, 
den y rights guarant eed by the federal constitution if the s tate 
act i on complained of is unlawful as a matter of state law . Thus , 
if state statu tes , rules , or constitutional principl es preclude 
the state act i on in question, t here is no need to assess the 
federal consti t utionality of that action . See Linde , supra at 
383 . This ana l ytical approach is known as the "primacy model , " 
We s t , 872 P . 2d at 1005- 07, and we h a ve endorsed it in a number o f 
cases, see , e . g ., id. at 1006- 07 , 1020-21 (adopting the pri macy 
model in the defamation context ) ; State v . Ramirez , 817 P . 2d 774 , 
781 - 84 (Utah 1991) (addressing defendan t ' s c l aim under article I , 
section 7 of the Utah Constitut ion before proceeding to his 
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution) ; Amax Magnesium Corp . v . Tax Comm' n , 796 P . 2d 1256, 
1261 (Utah 1990) (" [I]f t he cha l lenged statute cannot withstand 
attack under t he state constitution, there is no reason to reach 
the federal question ." ) . We have , however , historically relied 
on other approaches , usually because of the way in which such 
issues have been framed by the parties . See , e . a ., St ate v . 
Larocco , 794 P . 2d 460 , 464-65 , 471 (Utah 1990) {plurality 
opi nion) (conducting a federal constitutional analysis of the 
defendant ' s u n lawful search claim before conducting a state 
constitutiona l analysis , and concluding t hat the search was 
reasonable under the federal consti t ution but not under the state 
cons ti tut ion) . 
134 Federal constitutiona l discourse and v ocabulary have 
dominated constitut ional criminal procedure cases for so long 
that it continues to be difficult for lawyers to shift their 
per spectives i n state cases . A recent example of suc h 
difficulties in Utah was commented on by Justice Stevens in his 
separate opinion in Brigham City v . Stuart , 126 S . Ct . 1943 
(20 0 6) (Stevens , J ., concurring). That case was on appeal from 
this court ' s review of a search and seizure question in Brigham 
City v . Stuart , 2005 UT 13 , 122 P . 3d 506 , rev ' d , 126 S . Ct . 1943 
(2006) . In our opinion , we noted the line of Utah cases i n wh ich 
we have concluded that Utah ' s search and seizure provisions 
(which are identical to those in the federal constitution) 
provide "a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth 
A.~endment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court . " 
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Id . i~ 10-11 . We criticized the failure of the appellant to 
raise and argue the state claims, and observed : "Where the 
parties do not raise or adequately brief state constitutional 
issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent." Id . ~ 12. 
~35 The Un ited States Supreme Court granted certiorari "in 
light of differences among state courts and the federal courts of 
appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard 
governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency 
situation . " Brigham Citv, 126 S . Ct . at 1947 . In his separate 
opinion , Justice Stevens addressed what he viewed as the futility 
of the Court's exercise in granting certiorari and resolving the 
federal question: 
Our holding today addresses only the 
limitations p l aced by the Federal 
Constitution on the search at issue; we have 
no authority to decide whether the police in 
this case violated the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court , however , has 
made clear that the Utah ConsLitution 
provides greater protection to the privacy of 
the home than does the Fourth Amendment. And 
it complained in this case of respondents' 
failure to raise or adequately brief a state 
constitutional challenge, thus preventing the 
state courts from deciding the case on 
anything other than Fourth Amendment grounds . 
The fact that this admonishment and 
request came from the Utah Supreme Court in 
this very case not only demonstrates that the 
prosecution selected the wrong case for 
establishing the rule it wants , but indicates 
that the Utah Supreme Court would probably 
adoot the same rule as a matter of state 
constitutional law that we rejec t today under 
the Federal Constitution. 
Id . at 1950 (Stevens , J . , concurring) (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted). 
~36 The State ' s resistance to this court ' s treatment of the 
state constitutional issues raised in this case reflects the same 
short-sightedness described by Justice Stevens in Brigham City . 
The federal law on this quesLion will serve only as a contingent 
rule in Utah until this court has settled the primary question of 
state law, and all parties, including the State, are well - advised 
to assist this court in its obligations to interpret that law . 
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~3 7 Furthermore, we reject the State's suggestion in its 
brief that there is a formula of some kind for adequate framing 
and briefing of state constitutional issues before district 
courts and this court . 6 We have on numerous occasions cited with 
favor the traditional methods of constitutional analysis . See , 
sQ_,_, State v. Gardner , 947 P . 2d 630 , 633 (Utah 1997) ( " In 
interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the 
language of the constitution itself but may also look to 
'historical and textual evidence, sister state law , and policy 
arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to 
ass ist us in arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision 
in question .'" (quoting Soc ' y of Seoarationists v. Whitehead, 870 
P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993))} . We have als o frequently noted 
that mere mention of ~tate provisions will not suffice . We 
disagree , however , with the trial court ' s suggestion in its 
Memorandum Decision that Tiedemman' s failure to offer analysis of 
the "unique context in which Utah ' s Constitution developed [or to 
show) why this State ' s Constitution should be interpreted 
differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution" precluded treatment of the state 
claim. Historical arguments may be persuasive i n some cases , but 
they do not represent a sine aua non in constitutional analysis . 
Further, we do not r equire some showing that federal analysis is 
flawed in order to undertake independent state interpretation, 
although we have occasionally used such arguments to bolster our 
conclusions . See , e . g. , Larocco, 794 P.2d at 467-70 (plurality 
opinion} (recognizing "significant confusion" in federa l search 
and seizure law and taking the opportunity to simplify search and 
seizure rules under the Utah Constitution by interpreting article 
I , section 14 to provide greater privacy protections wi~h regard 
to automobile searches than the federal constitution}; State v . 
Watts , 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("[C]hoosing to give 
the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction [than the 
federal constitution) may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent 
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal 
courts ." } In theory , a claimant could rely on nothing more than 
6 We likewise reject the court of appeals ' suggestion in 
State V . Bobo , 803 P . 2d 1268 (Utah Ct . App . 1990 ), t ha t an 
attorney must follow a set fo rmula in order to adequately brief a 
state constitutional issue . Id . at 1273 n.5 (instructing 
attorneys wi shing to raise state constitutional issues in their 
briefs to (1) analyze "the unique context in which Utah's 
constitution developed"; (2) "demonstrate that state appellate 
courts regul arly interpret even textually s i milar state 
constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal 
interpretations of the United States Constitution" ; and (3) cite 
"authority fron other states supporting the particular 
construction urged by counsel"). 
13 No . 20050676 
plain language to make an argument for a construction of a Utah 
provision that would be different from the interpretation the 
federal courts have given similar language. Independent analysis 
must begin with the constitutional text and rely on whatever 
assistance legitimate sources may provide in the interpretive 
process. There is no presumption that federal construction of 
similar language is correct . 
i38 In this case, Tiedemann clearly raised the state 
constitutional question and submitLed arguments, albeit ones the 
trial court found unpersuasive , below. Likewise , in his brief on 
appeal , Tiedemann has devoted a separate section of his brief to 
the issue o f state due process requiremenLS in the context of 
destruction of evidence by the State. He has cited Utah due 
process cases and decisions from other state courts construing 
their due process requirements, including a number of states that 
have rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in 
interpreting federal law . Given our call in Briaham City for 
litigants to participate in the development of state 
constitutional principles, we should not decline to treat the 
claims properly raised here . 
B. State Due Process and Destroyed Evidence 
139 The question before us is whether a defendan t must show 
bad faith on the part of the State in the loss or destruction of 
evidence before h e may seek a remedy under state law . 
!40 It is a matter of clear Utah law that criminal 
defendants are ent i tled to information possessed by the State to 
aid in their defense. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure imposes broad obligations on prosecutors to produce 
such information or make it available to a defendant . Utah R. 
Crim. P. 16 . We have on numerous occasions enforced its 
requi rements , and we noted in State v. Knight : 
The prosecutor ' s good faith should not 
have had a ny impact on the tria l court ' s 
determinat i on of whether the prosecutor had 
violated his discovery duties . (T]he 
prosecutor ' s good faith ignorance does no t 
excuse non-disclosure . If any weight were 
given to good faith i gnorance, it would only 
encourage after-the-fact justifications for 
nondisclosure. 
734 P.2d 913 , 918 n . S (Utah 1987) . 
~41 We have identified several factors under rule 16 to 
guide a trial court's decision on a motion to e xcl ude prosecution 
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evidence because of a failure to fully disclose . State v. 
Kallin, 877 P . 2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994) . These factors are also 
relevant to a motion, like the one here, to dismiss charges for 
destruction of evidence. The nonexclusive factors we consider 
under rule 16 are 
(1) the extent to which the prosecution ' s 
representation [of the existing evidence) is 
actually inaccurate, ( 2) the tendency of the 
omission or misstatement to lead defense 
counsel into tactics or SLrategy that could 
prejudice the outcome, ( 3) the culpability of 
the prosecutor in omitting pertinent 
information or misstating the facts, and 
(4) the extent to which appropriate ciefense 
investigation woul d have discovered the 
omitted or missta t ed evidence. 
Id. Our approach under rule 16 should govern the destruction of 
evidence, and the culpability or bad faith of the state should be 
only one consideration, not a bright line test, as a matter of 
due process under article 1, section 7 of t he Utah Constitution. 
~42 Justice Stevens' separate concurrence in Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S . 51 (1988), argued that "there may well be 
cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State 
acted in bad faith but in which the l oss or destruction of 
evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a 
criminal trial fundamental l y unfair." Id . at 61. We agree with 
this assessment. Many states that have explored this question 
under their state due process guarantee s have also agreed . See, 
~, Thor ne v . Dep't of Pub. Safety , 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 
1989) (construing the due process clause of the Alaska 
Constitution to not requ ire a showing of bad faith); State v. 
Mora l es, 657 A.2d 585, 594 - 95 (Conn . 1995) (concluding that the 
state due process clause does not have the same meaning as the 
federal due process clause and that it requires a bal ancing of 
the materiality of missing evidence, the reasons for its 
unava i lability , Lhe likel ihood of mistake by witnesses or juries, 
and the pre j udice to the defendant); Hammond v. State, 5 69 A. 2d 
81, 87 (Del . 1989) (noting that rules regarding preservation of 
evidence are gene rally matters of state law and reaffirming prior 
test for balancing degree of negligence or bad faith, importance 
of missing evide nce , and suffi c i ency of othe r evidence in support 
of convic t ion) ; State v . Mata feo, 787 P . 2d 671, 673 (Haw . 1990) 
(recognizing that due process inquiry must go beyond Younablood 
because, in some cases, t h e state may d e stroy evidence, i n good 
or bad fa ith, that is so c ri tical to the defense that it makes 
the rule unfair); Commonwealth v . Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496, 496-
97 (Mass . 1991) (holding that Massachusetts' due process rule is 
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stricter than the federal rule and requires bal ancing of the 
government's culpability , materiality of the evidence , and 
potential prejudice to the defendant); State v . Ferguson, 2 
S.W.3d 912 , 914 (Tenn . 1999) (ho l ding that "the due process 
principles of the Tennessee Constitution are broader than those 
enunciated in the [federa l] Constitution" and " fundamenta l 
fairness . . requires that the State ' s failure to preserve 
evidence that could be favorable to the defendant be evaluated in 
the context of the entire record") ; State v . Delisle , 648 A. 2d 
632 , 642-43 (Vt . 1994) (holding that where the def endant shows a 
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be 
exculpatory , state constitutional due process standards require 
balancing of the culpability of the government , the prejudice to 
a defendant , and the importance of the lost evidence) ; State v . 
Osakalumi , 461 S . E.2d 504 , 512 (W. Va. 1995) (holding as a matter 
of state constitutional law that "fundament al fairness requires 
[the court] to evaluate the State ' s fail u re to preserve 
potentially exculpatory evidence in the context of the enti re 
record") . 7 
7 Ironically , Arizona is one of the states that has adopted 
a bright-line bad faith requirement as a matter of state due 
process . On remand from the United States Supreme Court in the 
Younablood case , the Arizona Court of Appea l s held that " the Due 
Process Clause of the Arizona Constitution provides greater 
protection than i ts federal counterpart . " State v . Youngblood, 
790 P.2d 759, 762 (Ariz . Ct . App . 1989) (citation omitted). The 
Arizona Supreme Court disagreed . In State v. Younoblood , 844 
P . 2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993) , the court relied on prior state law, 
including the availability of a jury instruction permitting 
inferences from mi ssing material evidence favorable to the 
defendant , and held that ' 'absent bad faith on t he part of the 
state, the failure to preserve evidentiary mater i al wh i ch could 
have been subjected to tests , the results of which might have 
exonerated the defendant , does not constitute a denial of due 
process of law under the Arizona Constitution . " Id . at 1158 . 
Ot her states adopting a bad faith rule as a matter of state 
law include California , People v. Cooner , 809 P.2d 865 , 886 (Cal. 
1991) (rejecting defendant ' s argument that t he court shoul d not , 
as a matter of state law, follow federal cases regarding 
destruction of evidence issues and instead appl y ing Younablood to 
defendant ' s claims); Kentucky, Col l i ns v . Commonwealth , 951 
S . W. 2d 569 , 572 - 73 (Ky . 1997) (decl ining to reject Youngbl ood 
approach based on defendant ' s argument that the Ken t ucky 
Constitution used different wording than the federal 
constitution) , and North Carolina , State v . Drdak, 411 S . E . 2d 
604 , 608 (N . C . 1992 ) (rejecting defendant ' s destruction of 
evidence c laim under the North Carolina Constitution because he 
failed to show bad faith). 
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~43 In Delisle, for example, the Vermont Supreme Court 
rejected the use of the Youngblood test as the standard under its 
state constitution. Delisle, 648 A.2d at 643. In rejecting the 
federal standard, the court noted that it believed Younablood was 
"both too broad and too narrow . " Id. Specifically, the court 
stated that Younablood was too broad because it required "the 
imposition of sanctions even though a defendant [did not] 
demonstrate [] [any] prejudice from the lost evidence . " Id. And 
it was too narrow because i t "limit[ed] due process violations to 
only those cases in which a defendant can demonstrate bad faith, 
even though the negligent loss of evidence may critically 
prejudice a defendant . " Id. The court therefore adopted its own 
test . Id . Under the test, if a defendant demonstrated "a 
reasonable possibility that the lost evidence would be 
exculpatory," then the court would determine the proper sanctions 
by balancing "(l) the degree of negligence or bad faith on the 
part of the government; (2) the importance of the evidence lost; 
and (3) other evidence of guilt adduced at trial." Id . at 642-
43. 
~44 Like the Vermont Supreme Court, we be lieve that the 
federal rule adopted in Youngblood is "both too broad and too 
narrow" to serve as an adequate safeguard of the fundamental 
fairness required by article I, sect ion 7 of the Utah 
Constitution . Thus, we conclude that some balancing of factors 
on a case - by-case basis is required. That balancing should 
embrace the basic principles we have adopted under rule 16 and 
the factors mentioned by other states . In cases where a 
defendant has shown a reasonable probability that lost or 
destroyed evidence would be exculpatory, we find it necessary to 
require consideration of the following: (1) the reason for the 
destruction or loss of the evidence , including the degree of 
negligence or culpability on the part of the State ; and (2) the 
degree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality 
and importance of the missing evidence i n the context of the case 
as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence . 
i45 The touchstone for the balancing process is fundamental 
fairness. If the behavior of the State i n a given case is so 
reprehensible as to warrant sanction, a sanction might be 
available even where prejudice to the defendant is slight or only 
speculative . I f prejudice to the def endant, on the other hand, 
is extreme, fairness may require sanction even where there is no 
wrongdoing on the part of the State . In between those extremes, 
we have confidence that trial judges can strike a balance that 
preserves defendants' constitutional rights without undue 
hardship to t he prosecution . 
i46 In this case, T iedemann has not shown any degree of 
culpability or bad faith on the part of the State , and the 
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reasons for the loss of t he evidence are entirely routine and 
benign : the passage of a very long period of time and the 
State ' s assumption , based on expert testimony , that Tiedemann 
would never become competent to stand trial . However , as to the 
second category of considerations , the trial court has had no 
opportunity to review them under the state due process clause , 
and neither party has briefed their application to the facts 
here. Thus, we remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings on these matters. 
CONCLUSION 
147 Because the majority concludes that Tiedemann's 
responses to certain questions during his interrogation are 
admissible, we remand this case to the trial court to determine 
which responses are in that category. Furthermore, we reverse 
the pretrial order denying Tiedemann's motion to dismiss based on 
the State ' s destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence , and 
likewise remand that issue for the trial court ' s consideration in 
light of this opinion . 
DURRANT , Justice , writing for the ma jority : 
148 We agree with our colleagues that Tiedemann validly 
waived his right to remain silent. We further agree that a 
defendant who wishes to invoke this right after having waived it 
bears the burden of clearly communicating that desire . We 
d isagree as to whether Tiedemann met this burden . Chief Justice 
Durham is of the view that Tiedemann did, in fact, clearly 
reinvoke his right to remain silent and would t herefore exclude 
all of his answers to questions posed after that reinvocation. 
Justice Wilkins is of the view that Tiedemann did not clearly 
r einvoke his right and would therefore exclude none of his 
answers . We believe the better interpretation lies in between 
these two views. 
149 A defendant controls his right to remain silent. He 
may invoke it as to all matters or only as to some. He may 
choose to discuss some topi cs while eschewing others . By stating 
"I don't want to talk about it ,u Tiedemann clearly indicated a 
desire not to talk about something. The ambiguity l ies in the 
p r onoun "it." What did Tiedemann not want to talk about? Our 
reading of the transcript leads us to conclude that , at a 
minimum, Tiedemann did no t want to talk about " what happened to 
Suzie .u To us th i s much is clear. It is far from clear , 
howe ver, whether he intended to assert his right to remain silent 
beyond this , and we believe the officers were t h erefore entitled 
to seek appropriate clari ficaLion . But in seeking that 
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clarification, they were not entitled to direct questions 
specifically to " what happened to Suzie . " 
~50 The transcript reads as follows with respect to 
Tiedemann 's first indicat ion that he wished to reassert in some 
measure his right to remain silent: 
RE (Detective Ron Edwards) 
Okay, do you know why we ' re going to talk to 
you? 
ET (Edgar Tiedemann): 
Ya. 
RE : What are we going to talk to you about? 
ET: The murders out there . 
RE : What murders? 
ET : The murders out t here at West Valley . 
RE : Who are they? 
ET : Suzie, Chuck and Scotty . 
RE: Whose Suzie? 
ET : She's the woman I love . 
RE: That you love? 
ET : Ya. 
RE : What happened to her? 
ET : I don ' t want to tal k about it . 
151 The obvious candidate for the antecedent of the pronoun 
" it" in "I don 't want to talk about it" is the immediately 
preceding question : "What happened to her?" Thus , Tiedemann 
effectively stated: "I don ' t want to talk about what happened to 
Suzie . " We believe this to be the fairest interpretation of 
Tiedemann's statement . But theoretically the antecedent of "it" 
may have been " The murders out there at Wes t Valley," making 
Tiedemann's statement the equivalent of "I don ' t want to talk 
about the murders out there at West Valley . " 
~52 Given this ambiguity as to the scope of Tiedemann' s 
reinvocation of his right to remain silent, we believe the police 
officers were entitled to seek clarificat ion. And we t hink the 
manner in which they did so was perfectly appropriate . Sergeant 
Spann first asked, "What don ' t you want to talk about?"8 In 
response, Tiedemann stated, '' I love that woman so much." 
Sergeant Spann again asked, "What is it that you don't want to 
talk about? You said murders in West Valley , where in West 
Valley?" A discussion then fol l owed regarding Tiedemann's 
address and the fact that "Suzie and Scotty and they just moved 
in last nigh t." Detective Edwards then again asked, "Okay, what 
do~'t you want to talk about? Edgar? What don ' t you want to 
5 A review of the videotape reveals that this was the 
actual question , not the question indicated in the transc~ipt. 
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talk about, Ed?" After waiting for a reply for close to ten 
seconds, Sergeant Spann stated as fol l ows: 
Edgar, we ' re not going to force you [to) talk 
about anything . We ' re asking you questions. 
As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer[] 
this question[] , not answer that question, 
answe r this question , not answer that 
question. You don 't have to answer any of 
our questions at all . You can stop at 
anytime . 
To this Tiedemann replied, "Okay . " Sergeant Spann added, "He 
made that clear to you , right?" Tiedemann responded, "Ya." 
~53 As we view the videotape, Tiedemann was not denied the 
opportunity to clarify the scope of his reinvocation of the right 
to remain silent; rather, the officers gave him multiple 
opportunities to clarify the scope of his reinvocation. Further, 
the officers emphasized to Tiedemann that he controlled his 
right, that he could "answer this question, not answer that 
question." The officers were not deceptive, abusive, or 
intimidating. Nor did they cut off Tiedemann ' s opportunity to 
clarify his reinvocation of his right to remain silent . Despite 
this opportunity, at this point in the interrogation, Tiedemann 
had unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent only as to 
Suzie, but not as to the other victims. Therefore , while the 
officers were precluded from asking about Suzie, they were free 
to ask about the other victims. 
~54 Accordingly , we believe that Detective Edwards was 
justified in posing the question "Okay, we were called to your 
home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen some people. Who 
shot them?" Tiedemann could have answered the question without 
reference to Suzie, and the officers were entitled to ask about 
the other victims . Tiedemann stated, "Me ," to which Detective 
Edwards responded, "You did?" Tiedemann replied, "Ya." 
Detective Edwards then asked , "Why did you shoot them?" Again, 
Tiedemann could have answered the question without reference to 
Suzie, and the officers were entitled to ask about the other 
victims. Instead Tiedemann volunteered , "I shot Suzie cause I 
love her and I shot the other two . " 
~55 The interrogation then proceeded, and the officers 
asked questions specifically about Chuck and Debra . They then 
asked another question that did not reference a particular 
victim : ''Okay, why? Why did you shoot them?" Tiedemann again 
volunteered information about Suzie: "I shot Suzie cause I love 
her, I love her so much ." At this point in the interrogation , 
Detective Edwards asked Tiedemann two questions specifically 
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about Suzie . Further , at various points in the questioning t hat 
followed , the offi cers asked Tiedemann questions spec ifical ly 
about Suzie . We would exclude all of Tiedemann ' s responses to 
such questions . But we would allow Tiedemann ' s responses to all 
questions that were not specifically about Suzie and could have 
been answered as to the other victims without reference to Suzie . 
~56 We agree with all other aspects of the majority 
opinion . 
~57 Justice Parrish and Justice Nehring concur in Justice 
Durran t ' s opinion . 
WILKINS , Associate Chief J ustice , d i ssenting : 
~58 I r e spectfully dissent . Once Mr . Tiedemann effectively 
waived his righ t to rema i n silent , he was subject to police 
interrogation until he unequivocally reinvoked that right. 
Careful review of the record, including the video recording of 
the criti cal portion of the inter rogation, makes onl y one th i ng 
clear : Mr. Tiedemann was not unequivocal in any attempt he may 
have made to reinvoke his right to silence. As a consequence , 
his statements to the police i nterrogators after voluntari ly 
waiving his rights against self- incrimination may properly be 
admitted in any trial relating to his multiple murder , attempted 
murder , aggravated assault, and rape charges . 
~59 All agree that Mr. Tiedemann voluntarily and 
effectivel y waived his right to remain silent when initially 
informed of his right to do so . After careful l y reconfirming the 
waiver and Mr . Tiedemann ' s understanding of the waiver at the 
beginning of the video recording of the interrogation , the 
officers ask him what happened . Mr . Tiedemann answers a number 
of questions , including some referring to one of the murder 
victims , Suzie . When the officer asks what happened to Su zie , 
Mr. Tiedemann says he does not ' 'want to talk about i t . " 
~60 The confusion , if any , arises from Mr . Tiedemann ' s 
response. It is clear from review of the interrogation video 
that the officers were careful to inquire as to what Tiedemann 
did , and did not , want to talk about . Mr . Tiedemann failed to 
clarify his ambiguous statements, and the off i cers properly 
continued questioning . Once Mr . Tiedemann was asked to c l arify 
t he meaning of his ~I don' t want to talk about it" statement , the 
officers were under no obligation to probe further when the 
defendant failed to offer any clarification. Once he waived his 
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right to remain silent, Mr . Tiedemann assumed the duty to clearly 
and unequivocally reinvoke that right if that was his intention . 
An ambiguous statement followed by non-responsive replies to 
questions about what he does not want to talk about does not 
shift the burden back to the state to figure it out . 
161 In addition , when the video of the interrogation is 
viewed, it becomes clear that t h e officers acted properly and 
gave ample time for Mr . Tiedemann to respond to questioning. The 
transcript records the questioning as follows : "Okay, what don't 
you want to talk about? Edgar? What don ' t you want to talk 
about , Ed? Edgar, we ' re not going to force you to talk about 
anything . u What the transcript fails to illustrate is the 
pauses between each question to allow time to answer . Because 
Mr. Tiedemann did not respond to any of the questions , the 
transcript shows one question after another . It could appear 
that the officers were barraging Mr . Tiedemann with questions , 
and that Mr. Tiedemann had no time to process, yet alone answer, 
the questions . 
162 The unedited video, on the other hand, shows that the 
officers allowed ample time for Mr . Tiedemann to respond ; he 
simply failed to do so . The officers paused between each 
question, sometimes for up to ten seconds, to allow h i m to 
respond . Mr . Tiedemann failed to clarify his equivocal 
statement . 
163 As we have said before, "if the suspect is not 
reasonably clear in his [attempt to stop ques tioning after 
waiving his rights] , officers are not required to stop 
questioning or focus on clarifying the suspect ' s statement . u 
State v . Levva , 951 P.2d 738 , 742 (Utah 1997) . The officers , i n 
the case of Mr . Tiedemann, went beyond what our law requires. 
When faced with the ambiguous statement , the officers gave Mr . 
Tiedemann ample opportunity to c l early reinvoke his right to 
remain silent. Not only did h e fail to clarify his intent, he 
listened to the officers explain again that he could stop 
answering at any t ime and that they would not force him to answer 
any question . Given this reemphasis and patient inquiry by the 
officers , however, he failed to c l ear the ambiguity, and, in 
f act , continued to answer questions about Lhe murders and other 
crimes . 
'Jl64 The law places a "heavy burden" on the state to 
ini tially establish a suspect's knowi ng and voluntary waiver of 
the constitutiona l right to remain silent in the face of police 
interrogation, and rightly so. Id . at 743 . However , once a 
suspect has volun t arily and knowingly waived that right, any 
attempt to reinvoke the right shifts the burden, and the 
requirement of c l arity , to the suspect . Id . In other words, the 
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law only requires the state to prove the right was lawfully 
waived . He who claims to reinvoke the right thereafter must 
prove that it was done with sufficient clarity as to make it 
unambiguous . A statement, taken in context, that a suspect 
doesn ' t want to talk about "i t ," without more, is insufficient to 
shift t he burden back to the state. A careful post-hoc parsing 
of the phrasing and language by a reviewing court may be helpful, 
but it would impose an unattainable burden on law enforcement , 
and likely result in the need to treat any suggestion as a 
"clear" re-invocation of the right waived . Such a result is 
neit her required, nor useful. 
,6s In the parallel circumstance of a suspect first waiving 
and then making an ambiguous request for counsel, we reached the 
same conclusion . Relying on reasoning from both our prior 
decision in Leyva, and the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Davis v. United States, 512 U. S . 452 (1994), we observed that 
the requirement . . that an officer limit 
his questioning to clarifying a suspect's 
ambiguous or equivocal invocation of the 
right to counsel must be l imi ted to prewaiver 
scenarios. [A]fter a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights , law 
enforcement officers may continue questioning 
until and unless the suspect clearly r equests 
an attorney. In other words, police do not 
need to limit their questioning to clarifying 
questions when a suspect who has previously 
waived his Miranda rights makes an ambiguous 
request for counsel . Furthermore, we see n o 
reason why this same rule should be different 
for ambiguous assertions of the right to 
remain silent. Therefore, because it is 
undisputed that [the defendant) voluntari ly 
waived his Mi randa rights, the detectives 
were free to question him until and unless he 
unambiguous l y reinvoked either his right to 
counsel or his right to remain silent . 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 , 935 n . 4 (Utah 1998) (citations and 
internal quotations omi tted). 
t66 In the case before us , the officers were unabl e to 
determine from his statement whether Mr. Tiedemann wished to 
reinvoke his right to remain si lent . Due to the equivoca l n ature 
of Mr. Tiedemann's statement , and despite being under no 
obligation to do so , the officers made reasonable attempts to 
understand what h e meant. They asked , "What don 't you want to 
talk about?" After a l lowing ample time for Mr. Tiedemann to 
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respond and clarify his statement , which h e did not do, the 
officers continued with q uestioning , and Tiedemann confessed to 
the murders. The officers were well within the bounds of 
constitutional behavior in doing so. 
~67 The trial court agreed that Mr . Tiedemann ' s 
reinvocation of the right to remain silent, if that was what it 
was intended to be , was ambiguous . My colleagues concede that 
the "scope of Tiedemann' s invocat i on" was ambiguous. I do not 
read the record or view the video recording of the event to 
reveal a nything other than that Mr . Tiedemann ' s statement was 
ambiguous, at most . One coul d very easily conclude that the 
statement was more of an expression of remorse and pain than one 
of reinvoked rights . 
~68 Ultimately, Mr . Tiedemann knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to remain silent. Th e heavy burden that rests 
upon the state to establish a valid waiver in the first place 
shifts thereaft er to the defendant to prove a reinvocation of t h e 
waived right . Once he waived his right to silence , this burden 
shifted to Mr . Tiedemann. He failed to unequivocally reinvoke 
his right , and his confession is properly subject to admission . 
i69 I woul d affirm the decision of the trial court that the 
defendant failed to adequately reinvoke his right to remain 
silent . 
i70 Moreover , given my analysis of the admissibility of Mr . 
Tiedemann ' s confession~ to t he _various crimes with which h e is 
charged, I see no possibility , as a matter of law, of any 
prejudice arising from the State's destruction of any of the 
evidence over the years. Consequently , I would affirm the 
decis i on of the trial court on that matter as well . 
i71 I would aff i rm. 
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IN THE DISTRICT coURT oF THE THIRD JUDICIAL mmF.BWl~~ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ JAfJ ~ ICT coui:n 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF U'IlfWsr 2 1 2015 
JORD DEPT, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LISSETTE MARIAN DEJESUS 
Defendant . 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No . 141400093 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: January 21 , 2015 
The above matter came before the court for decision an 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant was charged by an information filed January 14, 
2014 with assault by a prisoner. The charge in summary is that 
on September 27, 2013 , while an inmate at the Utah State Prison, 
defendant assaulted a guard, Robert Hansen (Hansen) with intent 
to cause bodily injury. After preliminary hearing and a 
bindover, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. On September 
12 , 2014, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in summary 
that the State had destroyed evidence which merited a dismissal 
of the case . The State fi led an opposition on September 24, 
2014. Defendant filed a reply on October 6 , 2014. Oral argument 
was set for October 7, 2014 . 
The court heard argument and determined .it needed 
additional factual evidence , a nd scheduled an evidentiary h earing 
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for November 4, 2014, but that was postponed until December 2, 
2014, by agreement _of the parties. On November 26, 2014, and 
given the holiday, in effect one day before the December 2 
hearing, defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of 
her motion to dismiss. At that hearing on December 2, 2014, the 
court heard evidence and received further argument and again 
determined it needed additional evidence and the State requested 
additional time to respond to the supplemental memorandum of 
defendant recently filed. The court thus scheduled hearing and 
argument for December 18, 2014, but due to an emergency a witness 
was unavailable and further evidence and argument was heard on 
January 15, 2015. 
Throughout each of these hearings defendant was present with 
Wesley J. Howard and the State was present through Coleen K. 
Witt . 
The court heard argument at each of the three hearings . The 
court has considered all of the pleadings filed, including the 
attachments which include the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing and other mater i als and argument. On January 15, 2015, 
the court took the issues under advisement. Now being fully 
advised, the court issues this memorandum decision . 
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Based on the above, the court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison on 
September 27, 2013 in what is called Timpanogas 3, a female 
housing unit at the Utah State Prison. Defendant shared a cell 
number 416 with an inmate named Dash. Dash and Khan, a resident 
of cell number 415, were being escorted back to their cells by 
Hansen after recreation t i me and defendant was in her cell , 
number 416, which is on the second tier and adjacent to number 
415. When the doors were opened defendant came out of her cell 
and defendant and K.½an engaged in some form of combat . (The court 
is not making any findings, of course, with respect to guilt or 
innocence, but only for this motion.) Khan had been instructed 
to go to her cell #415 as Hansen followed but instead went to 
stand in front of defendant's cell #416. Hansen then attempted to 
insert himself between the defendant and Khan. Hansen pulled 
defendant off and tried to push defendant back into her cell and 
that failed and defendant came out of her cell again and Hansen 
threw defendant to the ground . Hansen testified at the 
preliminary hearing that defendant then kicked him twice, in the 
abdomen and groin area , after looking him in the eye . Hansen said 
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on direct examination Khan was not anywhere near that area. On 
cross examination he said he did ,10t see Kahn when defendant 
kicked him, Khan was behind Hansen, not on his shoulder, but 
Hansen could not see I<han . 
2. The prison maintains a system of cameras which captured 
the events on a digital recorder, similar to a home digital video 
recorder, or DVR. It is not a video tape where an actual, 
physical recording is made. That device runs continuously until 
it is "full" and then other events shown on the cameras are 
captured "over" older images. It is not a permanent record 
unless someone has the Information Technology {IT) department at 
the Department of Corrections make, or "burnn a disc from that 
recording device. Thus after approximately 30 days, though there 
is no formal policy in place, unless the images selected are 
copied onto a permanent medium, sach as a compact disc, the 
images captured temporarily are gone and irretrievable as they 
are "recorded" over or eliminated in some way not provided to the 
court by the evidence. 
3 . Defendant's factual claim is that as Hansen was inserting 
himself between Khan and the defec1.dant Khan continued to attempt 
to strike and harm defendant, and defendant in protecting herself 
from Khan accidently struck Hansen without intent to cause bodily 
injury . Thus , she claims, the recording is and would be 
exculpatory. 
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4 . Hansen told his supervisor immediately after the event 
and wrote a report of the incident . The investigations division 
contacted Hansen later that same day and he gave them a statement 
as to what had occurred and received Hansen's written report . 
Eansen, within an hour after the alleged assault on September 27, 
2013, viewed the recording which was inside the control uni t, he 
played it back and could observe it . He testified that it showed 
that defendant kicked him and while doing so, Khan was 
approximately 4-6 behind Hansen and was not doing anything 
against defendant, merely standing behind Hansen while defendant 
and Hansen were engaged in their altercation. Hansen said when he 
told counsel on cross examination t nat he di d not know where Kahn 
was, that wa s based on what he knew at that time it was 
transpiring, but vie.wing the recording made him aware Kahn was 4 -
6 feet behind him and was not engaging defendant when defendant 
kicked Hansen . 
5. An investigator, Kemp, was assigned the case and spoke 
with the witnesses shortly after the event, including Hansen. 
Kemp asked someone, an employee Kemp did not know, in the control 
unit to get her, Kemp, a copy of the recording. Kemp does not 
actually work inside the prison and does not know t he names of 
the personnel and did not note it. Kemp is an investigator who 
investigates offenses within and without the prison involving 
Department of Corrections interests. At some point after 30 days 
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from the event, but on a date unknown, Kemp asked someone, again 
not recalling who , about the recording . Kemp was told by a 
captain on the unit that the record was not available and that if 
a hard copy had been made, it was lost. No one, in short, knows 
if in fact a hard copy recording was made but no one claims it 
exists . Kemp and other investigators at that time of the event 
and for about three months afterwards , was given an assignment to 
perform background checks which kept her unusually busy beyond 
what her normal duties required. 
6 . In part based on the press of that other business, the 
case was not brought to the office of the District Attorney 
(prosecution) until January 7, 2014, by which time the images 
captured on the recording device were eliminated and 
irretrievably lost. The case was filed shortly thereafter, as 
noted. Defendant filed a discovery request on or about January 
29, 2014, asking for any video recordings of the event. The 
State responded and stat ed on or about May 1, 2014, that it was 
"unable to provide any video of the incident as none exist as per 
the Utah State Prison . " 
7. Defendant's cell mate Dash was called as a witness at 
the evidentiary hearing of December 2, 2014 . She refused to talk 
about the incident and cited the Fifth Amendment. The court 
observed defendant when that occurred and as Dash left the stand. 
Defendant pulled faces and made facial expressions as if to 
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question what Dash had just done in open court. The meaning of 
the interchange is uncertain to the court. 
8 . Another female inmat e, Atata, testified at that same 
hearing that she was in another cell on the tier and observed 
Khan behind Hansen and that Khan was reaching toward defendant 
and trying to strike defendant when defendant hit Hansen. Atata 
has a close relationship with defendant . Atata describes 
defendant as her, Atata's, fiance. The court does not accept as 
true the testimony of Atata . That is not based solely on the 
relationship between Atata and defendant, but the court also 
observed defendant and Atata while Atata was testifying. It 
appeared to the court , and the court so finds, that defendant was 
making facial gestures and expressions of varying sorts to Atata 
depending on what Atata ·was saying in her testimony. Further, 
Atata admitted she was looking at the event from an angle, as she 
was in another cell, and Atata admitted she did not see 
everything but saw most of the event. The court thus does not 
accept her testimony at face value as being testimony the court 
can rely on to find the events were as she described. 
Based on the above findings, the court enters these : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DISCUSSION 
The law is set forth in State v . Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106 
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(UT. 2007). When there is a claim by a defendant that evidence is 
lost or destroyed, the court is to engage in a multi-step 
process. This court must engage in a balancing of factors. The 
defendant must first demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that 
lost or destroyed evidence would be excul patory. It is not 
sufficient to show a possibility that the evidence would be 
exculpatory . If a "reasonable probability" is shown, then the 
court is to consider the r eason for the destruction or loss or 
failure of preservation of the evidence, including the degree of 
negligence or culpability on the part of the State, and the 
decree of prejudice to the defendant in light of the materiality 
and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case 
as a whole, including the strength of the remaining evidence. 
The main principle is fundamental fairness. The Utah Supreme 
Court noted that if a sanction is warranted, it could be because 
of the serious conduct of the State or the degree of prejudice to 
the defendant . Trial courts are instructed to balance the factors 
to insure fairness . 
The court m~st first examine, as a threshold, whether 
defendant has demonstrated tha t it is reasonably probable that 
the recording would be exculpatory . Just what is "reasonably 
probableu is not as clear as the court would like. Here, 
defendant produced a witness, her fiance Atata, who said Khan was 
engaged in f ighting with defendant when defendaEt struck Hansen . 
-8- 0001.33 
• 
The court is aware at this point only of the prelimi nary hearing 
testimony and other testimony given by Hansen on December 2 , 
2014, as well as that of Dash and Atata on that same date . 
Whether there are other witnesses, prison staf f or inmates, who 
will at trial describe what they observed that day, if there are 
any such witnesses, is unknown to the court. Of course the 
parties are free to produce whatever witnesses they bel ieve have 
relevant information . 
The court gives little credit , at this point, based on its 
observations of Atata , defendant, and the i r relationship, to the 
testimony of Atata. Simply asserting that the recording would be 
helpful to defendant is obviously nothing more t han argument that 
possibly the recording would be exculpatory. There must be 
something in the evidence before the court NOW that shows the 
court there is some reasonable basis on which to believe the 
recording would show what defendant claims, that the striking of 
Hansen was either an accident while defendant was trying to 
engage in combat with Khan or that the striking was justified or 
occurred for some reason other than as claimed by Hansen that it 
was done to inflict bodily injury intentionally or knowingly. The 
only possible evidence defendant can assert that is now before 
the court is the testimony of Atata. To be reasonable evidence, 
to t his court, that evidence must be bel ievable . To this court, 
based on the findings above, the testimony was not believable and 
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thus is not reasonable. A jury may well conclude differently, 
however, and the court's belief at this point of course is 
irrelevant to what may be presented at a jury trial. The court 
is not indicating such evidence cannot be presented by defendant 
at a trial. The court is merely ruling that defendant has not 
shown a reasonable probability that the recording would be 
exculpatory. 
Thus, the court does not need to examine the reasons for the 
destruction or failure to preserve nor must the court determine 
the degree of prejudice suffered by defendant, if any. However, 
even if it is reasonably probable that the recording is 
exculpatory, the reasons for its non-existence do not support a 
dismissal. IF the court is wrong about the exculpatory nature of 
the recording, dismissal is not appropriate because of the facts 
and circumstances which resulted in the fail ure to preserve. 
First, in the court's view the State is incorrect about the 
destruction of the evidence and motivations. Obviously the 
"prosecution" here has done absolutely nothing to destroy or fail 
to preserve evidence . The destruction came about by t he action, 
or inaction, of the Department of Corrections personnel in 
failing to preserve evidence that was readily available at the 
time of the incident. The recording was gone before the case was 
filed. The State a rgued wrongly, respectfully, and contrary to 
common sense frankly, about motivations . If the recording showed 
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exactly as Hansen said, certainly it would seem to this court 
that common sense would indicate that recording would be 
retained, the figurative "Exh ibit A", so to s peak, in the case 
aga i nst defendant. The motivation, frankly, to destroy or fail 
to preserve such a recording would come if the recording 
supported some other factual situation than the one Hansen 
describes. If it showed con1:rary to what Hansen said, then it 
would make more logical sense to destroy it rather than if it 
supported him. The court does not believe that the lack of the 
evidence, however, is related to any "decis ion" made by anyone. 
Obviously, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for this 
court to understand why prison personnel would not, with full 
knowledge that a claimed assault had occurred by an inmate 
against a guard, maintain a recording of that event. Obviously, 
if the recording shows what Hansen testified it shows, there is 
no prejudice at all to defendant in the destruction of the 
recording. Only if the recording shows in essence what defendant 
claims would there be prejudice by its unavailablity . Because 
this court does not believe defendant has shown any reasonable , 
believable probability the recording showed what defendant 
claims, it does not matter why or how it was destroyed, or more 
properly not retained. But, as indicated, the court is 
discussing that element in the event the court is incorrect about 
the exculpatory nature of the event . More responsible conduct by 
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the investigative team, and all associated with this event, would 
preclude such a motion and preclude the requirement that the 
court attempt to "divine" what the recording showed. 
Here, the reasons given for the lack of preservation are 
believable, and amount to negligence but not in a high degree. 
The court finds no culpable conduct by anyone in the Department 
of Corrections. If the court believed that there was an 
intentional decision to record over this event, of course, the 
result would probably be different . 
Hansen cannot cause the recording to be preserved . The 
investigator, the court finds, asked the proper personnel to 
"make me a copy" of the event . It was not intentionally 
eliminated, or recorded over, the court finds, but it clearly 
should have been retained . The n~meless person who was asked to 
make a recording perhaps, for any number of reasons, evidently 
failed to do so. The investigator, in the press of other 
business , failed to follow up in a timely way. That does not , in 
this court's view, favor defendant to the extent that the court 
should or could find a malicious motive or culpabl e conduct by 
the investigative team at Corrections. It was negligence, but 
negligence born of a multitude of factors and the fact that many 
personnel are involved in a setting such as a prison control 
unit. Just why a recording was not made, and who failed to make 
that recording, are not found as facts by the court , other than 
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it was institutional negligence. The investigator should have, 
respectfully, conducted her investigation in a way that retains 
relevant evidence. This recording was clearly relevant. The 
failure to do so, however, was at most negligence, and not gross 
negligence and certainly not intentional. 
So, while the court feels it need not examine the reasons 
for the lack of preservation, if the court is wrong about there 
being a reasonable probability about the exculpatory nature of 
the recording, the reasons for the loss of the evidence favor the 
State rather than dismissal of the charges . Defendant is still 
free to testify and bring witnesses to the trial, though of 
course she has not burden to do so. The State is free to present 
whatever relevant evidence it has . The actual participant, 
Hansen, has at this point presented credible evidence. Many, 
indeed almost all, assaultive incidents resulting in a trial are 
not recorded and the finder of fact is required to listen to the 
witnesses and determine what happened. The fact that this event 
happened to be recorded does not mean that the failure to retain 
that recording should result in a dismissal of the case . 
Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to preserve 
evidence is DENIED. 
The matter is set for a sta tus conference at 1:30 p.m. on 
-13- 000138 
January 29, 2015, where a trial date will be scheduled. 
This Memorandum Decision is the Order of the court and no 
other order is required. 
DATED this v( day of/pfi-, 2015. 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, libe1ty or property, without due process of law. 
